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Title VII's Last Hurrah: Can Discrimination
Be Plausibly Pled?
Michael J. Zimmert

INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Supreme Court appears to be somewhat
inconsistent in how it approaches antidiscrimination law. One
recent opinion1 involves a potentially expansionist development
that makes proof of intent to discriminate, a key element in
most antidiscrimination cases, 2 simply a question of whether the
employer was aware of the racial (or gender) consequences of its
action. Other decisions push Title VII cases out of court into
arbitration, 3 which further complicates and diminishes the scope
of substantive protections of the law, thereby making Title VII
cases that remain in court more difficult to bring as class actions
or to advance as even individual cases beyond the pleading stage
of litigation. Given the breadth of the onslaught against a robust
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, it appears likely that the
thrust limiting antidiscrimination law will win out over the
alternative expansionist approach. If that is true, the Supreme
Court will be bringing to an end the availability of Title VII to

Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. My thanks to Barry
Sullivan,
Charlie Sullivan, and Juan Perea for their comments on earlier drafts. Also, thanks to
Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca Hanner White for all they have taught me over the years
we have worked together on our casebook. My research assistant, Jessica Ratner, Loyola
Chicago Class of 2014, provided significant help, particularly with the social science
research. And, as always, Margaret Moses.
1 Ricci v DeStefano, 557 US 557 (2009).
2 While this article will focus on intentional
disparate treatment discrimination,
Title VII also prohibits disparate impact discrimination. The disparate impact theory of
discrimination, which is codified in § 703(k) of Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e-2(k), does not
include discriminatory intent as an element of a prima facie case. In his concurrence in
Ricci v DeStefano, 557 US 557, 594-96 (2009), Justice Scalia appeared to call for a
challenge to the constitutionality of § 703(k) on equal protection grounds.
See, for example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc u Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
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help redress our society's longstanding and continuing problems
of employment discrimination.
The thrust of this paper is that the cutbacks in
antidiscrimination jurisprudence are unjustified. Whether or not
the new test of what constitutes intent to discriminate prevails
as a way to easily establish that the employer discriminated, the
Court should retreat from its efforts at diminishing
antidiscrimination law. If those reform efforts fail, more
substantial measures may be necessary to revive the
antidiscrimination project. One that would not require
legislation would be for the EEOC to redirect its efforts to
enforce the antidiscrimination project through litigation,
including assisting the private bar in its enforcement efforts. 4
Another would be to expand legal services to provide counsel for
the all too numerous pro se cases in court. A more fundamental
change would replace the current assumption that most
employment is at-will with some form of presumption of job
security.5 That would require an employer to prove a good
reason for any adverse action it took against a worker. More
drastic would be a proposal to review all of labor and
employment law and construct a new forum for its enforcement
that would essentially be independent of the judiciary. 6
De-escalating the attack on employment discrimination
would be justified if discrimination had in fact become an
artifact of an increasingly distant past. But, a variety of
statistical evidence illustrates that employment discrimination
persists. 7 Furthermore, emerging social science research
explains how and why discrimination continues, despite the
emergence of social norms eschewing expressions of animus and

4 See generally Stephanie Bornstein, Rights in Recession: Toward Administrative
AntidiscriminationLaw, 33 Yale L & Pol Rev (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
The states could change the general at-will presumption by statute or judicial
common law rule. The federal government could enact legislation overriding state at-will
law to the extent of Congressional commerce clause power.
6 In some sense, that would only be going back to the beginning when,
in the
legislative debates leading up to Title VII, there were proposals to create an
administrative agency to enforce Title VII based on the National Labor Relations Board
model. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 BC Indust & Comm L Rev,
431, 433 (1966). Had the opposition to more forceful governmental enforcement been
overcome, the state of the antidiscrimination project today would be much different.
See generally Ian Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race
and Gender Discrimination (Chicago 2001) (proposing that discrimination persists
broadly in society).
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discrimination. Part I will first present the evidence that
discrimination persists and describe the social science research
that helps explain that persistence. Part II will describe the
inconsistent development of antidiscrimination law by the
Roberts Court. First, it will describe the potentially expansionist
development based on the Court's decision in Ricci v DeStefano,8
a "reverse" discrimination case applying a "color-blind" standard
of liability. While the Court makes "reverse" discrimination
challenges by white plaintiffs quite easy, the Court has yet to
extend that very pro-plaintiff approach to cases brought by
women and people of color. Part II shows how that development
seems unlikely, as the Roberts Court has cut back the
substantive protections of antidiscrimination law while also
raising significant procedural barriers to challenges to
discrimination. Part III will then sketch out how, in light of all
these
developments,
plaintiffs
can
plausibly
plead
discrimination. Part IV concludes by outlining some measures
that may be necessary to resuscitate the antidiscrimination
project.
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PERSISTS

A question has arisen about how much discrimination
persists now that a general social norm has developed eschewing
expressions of racial or gender animus.9 The question is quite
significant for many reasons but, for the purposes of this paper,
the answer or answers to that question are necessary to
establish the appropriate baseline that the law, and particularly
judges, should assume when deciding discrimination claims. The
first subpart will explore the question of how much
discrimination persists by looking at it from multiple
perspectives. From most of those viewpoints, it is clear that
discrimination persists. The second subpart will explore some of
the social science research, particularly implicit bias research, to
show that discrimination is an all too general psychological
phenomenon that drives many employment decisions.

S557 US 557 (2009).

See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Racial Mirroring, 17 U Pa J Const L *20-23 (forthcoming
2014), online at http: //www.ssrn.com/abstract=2395302 (visited Oct 18, 2014) (noting
that "[s]uch negative stereotypes are no longer tolerated . . .").
9
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The Evidence that Employment Discrimination Continues

There is a perception, held at least by some members of the
Supreme Court and perhaps more generally, that there is much
less discrimination now than was true in the past. Some
commentators claim that the incidence of discrimination has
lessened, while others claim that discrimination persists but
that the Court just has failed to see it.10 Professor Suzanna
Sherry has argued persuasively that the Roberts Court has
changed some fundamental "intuitions about how the world
works," or to use her term, "foundational facts," resulting in the
shifting of some legal doctrine." What is also clear is that
background assumptions exist in every case because the judge or
factfinder always brings them to the task of evaluating the
evidence. Always present, these assumptions are not necessarily
always well informed. 12
A place to start is with the perceptions of workers who
believe that they have been discriminated against. According to
a 2005 public opinion poll conducted by The Gallup
Organization, 13 somewhere between 9 and 15 percent of people
employed in the United States reported that they had been
discriminated against in the workplace in the prior year.14 If
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics are to be believed,
there were about 155 million individuals in the labor force in
2012, a figure that includes the number of employed and
unemployed individuals.1 5 Assuming the low percentage and
10 See, for example, Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law:
After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 477 (2011).
" See Suzanna Sherry, FoundationalFacts and Doctrinal Change, U Ill L Rev 145,
146-47 (2011). See generally Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment:
Representative Democracy and the People's Elusive "Right to Know", 72 Md L Rev 1
(2012).
12 See Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011
No 4 Utah L Rev 1677, 1678.
s See Employee Discriminationin the Workplace *2 (Gallup Organization Dec 8,
2005),
online at http://media.gallup.com/government/PDF/GallupDiscrimination
ReportFinal.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
14 One reason for this range is that while the upper bound reflects all perceived
instances of discrimination, including discrimination for reasons such as favoritism,
sexual orientation, and education, the lower bound is adjusted to include only those
categories expressly prohibited by federal law, including gender, race, ethnicity, national
origin, age, disability, and religion. See id.
1"
See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Feb 5, 2013), online at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat0l.htm (visited Oct 18,
2014).
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assuming that not much has changed in the time between 2005
and 2012, that means that roughly 14 million workers a year at
least claim to have been the victim of discrimination.
More recent surveys support the view that a large
percentage of workers, particularly certain subgroups, think
that they have been discriminated against. A 2008 survey
revealed that 76 percent of African American, 44 percent of
Hispanics, 31 percent of Asians, and 20 percent of white workers
say they have been victims of race discrimination at some point
at work. 16 Forty percent of women and 20 percent of men think
that they have been the victims of sex discrimination. Finally,
43 percent of whites, 21 percent of African Americans and 16
percent of Hispanics report age discrimination. Results from a
2011 poll reveal that about one in four women have experienced
workplace sexual harassment. 17
There are, of course, good reasons to question whether these
statistics either overstate or understate the actual level of
discrimination. On the one hand, many workers may think they
have been discriminated against but have not been. Perceiving
of oneself as having been treated unfairly is not the same as
being a victim of discrimination. On the other hand, many
workers may have been discriminated against but they fail to
recognize what happened as discrimination or they might be
completely unaware that it happened.18 At least for a ballpark
figure, the extremely large number of workers who think they
have been victimized by employment discrimination supports
Findlaw.com Employment DiscriminationSurvey, Opinion Research Corporation
Study 717378 (on file with author).
17 See Washington Post-ABC News Poll: Workplace Harassment,
Wash Post Polls
(Wash Post 2014), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/
postabepoll 111311.html (visited Oct 18, 2014). A 2013 survey from the Tanenbaum
Center for Interreligious Understanding indicates that more than one-third of workers
report observing or being subjected to religious bias at work. See What American
Workers Really Think About Religion *8 (Tanenbaum Center For Religious
Understanding 2013), online at https: //www.tanenbaum.org/2013survey (visited Oct 18,
2014). Finally, surveys aggregated by the Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation on
Law and Public Policy show that gay and transgender individuals face widespread
discrimination in the workplace. Between 15 and 43 percent of gay workers and a
staggering 90 percent of transgender workers report some form of discrimination on the
job. See Crosby Burns and Jeff Krehely, Gay and Transgender People Face Workplace
Discriminationand Harassment *1 (Center for American Progress May 2011), online at
http: //www.americanprogress.org /wp-content /uploads/issues/20 11/06/pdf/workplace
discrimination.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
18 Of course, discrimination as defined by law is not the same as discrimination as
felt by someone.
16
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the conclusion that discrimination persists and remains a
serious social issue. A background assumption that the
phenomenon of discrimination has been reduced to a few badapple employers is unsupportable, even assuming a large
percentage of the workers' perceptions are wrong or, more likely,
do not accurately predict how the law might decide whether or
not they were victims of discrimination.
About 100,000 workers per year take the difficult step of
challenging the treatment they consider discriminatory by filing
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 19 There are, of course, many reasons why a worker who
thinks she has been discriminated against would nevertheless
not file an EEOC charge. 20 Those reasons start with ignorance of
the availability of remedies for discrimination but also include
fear of retribution or blacklisting as a troublemaker. Since the
economic value of many discrimination claims does not make
bringing a case economically feasible, even workers who know
their rights might still decide not to file a charge with the EEOC
or with any other forum that is available to resolve employment
discrimination disputes. Even if workers know that the law
prohibits discrimination and that legal redress is at least
theoretically available, many may feel that bringing a claim
would do no good but would likely lead to retaliation by the
employer and even by coworkers. 2 1
While data concerning the number of employment
discrimination claims that are brought in state courts is not
easily available, about 15,000 federal court cases are filed by
workers each year claiming employment discrimination. 2 2 All of
the reasons for not filing an EEOC charge also apply even more
powerfully to initiating litigation. Of those cases that are filed in

I9 2012, 99,412 individuals filed EEOC charges based on at least one of the ten
in
types of discrimination recognized by federal law. See Charge Statistics FY 1997
Through FY 2012, EEOC, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
20 For an extensive discussion of the reasons why workers do not bring claims even
though they think they have been the victims of discrimination, see Robert L. Nelson,
Ellen Berrey, and Laura Beth Nielsen, Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of
Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 103
(2008).
21 See Washington Post-ABC News Poll: Workplace Harassment (cited in note
17).
22 See US District Courts-Civil Cases Filed, by Nature
of Suit, Judicial Facts and
Figures (Administrative Office of the US Courts), online at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/201 1/Table404.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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federal court, 50 percent settle but about 19 percent are
dismissed either at the pleading stage or by summary
judgment. 2 3 Of the cases that do not settle early, plaintiffs lose
the motion for summary judgment in over half the cases and, of
the cases that remain active after disposition of a motion for
summary judgment, more than half settle before a trial
outcome. 24 In federal court, plaintiffs win about 36 percent of
cases tried to a jury and 25 percent of those tried by a judge. In
state court, plaintiffs win just over 60 percent of bench trials,
compared to about 53 percent of jury trials. 25
Data
concerning
the
arbitration
of employment
discrimination claims is even more difficult to find because
arbitration is private and confidential. California law requires
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the primary (but
not the only) arbitration provider, to publish data concerning its
provision of employment arbitration services. 26 Over a four-year
period, the AAA nationally administered arbitration in almost
4,000 cases, with 1,213 decided by an award after a hearing. 27
Employees won just over 21 percent of the cases, with a median
award amount of $36,500, which was much less than the
average award in court decisions. 28
Finding current and comprehensive statistical evidence of
the persistence of discrimination is difficult. But the evidence
that is available supports the conclusion that discrimination
remains a major problem in employment. The appropriate
background
assumption
for
purposes
of
analyzing
antidiscrimination law is that discrimination claims must be
taken seriously because discrimination is not an isolated,
occasional occurrence. The next subsection will explain why,
despite changes in social norms, discrimination persists.
See Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster, Individualized
Justice or Collective Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post
Civil Rights United States, 7 J Empl Legal Stud 175, 184 (2010).
24 Id at 184-87.
25 See Lynn Langton and Thomas H. Cohen, Civil
Bench and Jury Trials in State
Courts 2005 *3 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Oct 2008), online at http://www.bjs.gov/
content /pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014). Some states with strong liberal
traditions may decide more discrimination cases and decide them more favorably for
plaintiffs than more conservative states.
26 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J of Empirical Legal Stud 1, 1 (2011).
27 See
id.
28 See
id.
23
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The Reasons for the Persistence of Discrimination

This section will discuss formation and impact of
stereotyping, research regarding implicit bias, and scholarly and
judiciary responses to these areas of research.
Social science research shows that people do not always
base their decisions on conscious thinking, such as carefully
evaluating the economic consequences of a possible course of
action or even by intentionally forming and using prejudices
towards certain groups. 29 For example, in Thinking, Fast and
Slow, 30 Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman
demonstrates that people have two basic modes of thinking:
thinking fast, which is an initial, intuitive response to sensory
input, and thinking slow, a careful analytical review of that
input. 31
Research
indicates
that
the
organizational,
institutional, and unexplained beliefs of people-fast thinkingcan result in discrimination, regardlessof good intentions or lack
of conscious prejudice of the actor. These unquestioned
understandings that pervade decision-making processes can be
understood through the concept of how stereotyping operates.
Based on fast thinking, humans form stereotypes as part of
the necessary categorization of sensory input. 32 Forming
stereotypes is essential to our cognitive functioning because it
enables the categorization of those perceptions so action can be
taken depending on the category into which the perception
falls. 33 As actors living in an uncertain world, we are often
See generally Nelson, Berrey, and Nielsen, 4 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 103 (cited in
note 20).
so Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2011).
See also Charles W. Murdock and Barry Sullivan, Essay, What Kahneman Means for
29

Lawyers: Some Reflections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 Loyola U Chi L J 1377 (2013)
(relating the book to law and legal practice).
s Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (cited in note 30). Kahneman posits that
human beings think in two very different ways: "fast" or intuitive thinking, which he
calls "System 1," and "slow" or deliberate thinking, which he calls "System 2." Id at 2122.
32 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan L Rev 1161,

1187-88 (1995) ("The central premise of social cognition theory [is] that cognitive
structures and processes involved in categorization and information processing can. ..
result in stereotyping. . . . [O]nce in place, stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and
decisionmaking.").
" See id. For an interesting development about stereotyping and where it should be
the basis of legal regulation, see generally Anita Bernstein, What's Wrong with
Stereotyping?, 55 Ariz L Rev 655 (2013).
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required to make decisions under conditions of less than perfect
knowledge. 34 As a result, we often use subconscious shortcuts,
known as heuristics, to aid in making decisions when only
limited information has been presented.35 For example, reliance
on past experiences and memory cues often guides decision
making.36

While this works out well most of the time when making the
mundane decisions of daily life, it becomes problematic when the
samples from these memory cues do not represent the true
frequencies of events. 37 This is especially problematic when
these decisions relate to group membership, 38 since media
coverage, first impressions, and personal relevance often bias
memory and therefore bias the information that is more likely to
be recalled. Because these stereotypes can be formed absent any
conscious intent, stereotypes can operate at an unconscious
level. 39 Nevertheless, these stereotypes function as implicit
understandings and bias perceptions about people, and therefore
impact judgment when decisions about them are made.
The impact of stereotyping in influencing discriminatory
behavior is supported by scientific research demonstrating the
existence of implicit bias. Based on a careful and full review of

34 Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge 2004).

"

See id.

See Mahzarin R. Banaji and Anthony G. Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of
Good People 11-12 (Delacorte 2013), for an explanation of the availability and anchoring
heuristics. The availability heuristic, named by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, explains that "when instances of one type of event ... come more easily
to mind than those of another type, we tend to assume that the first event must occur
more frequently in the world." Id at 11. However, because "greater ease of availability to
the mind doesn't mean greater frequency of occurrence in the world," Banji and
Greenwald explain that this heuristic can lead us to overestimate frequencies of events,
and cause us to incur great decision costs. Id at 11-12. Another heuristic discovered by
Kahneman and Tvesrsky, called anchoring, explains the idea that "the mind doesn't
search for information in a vacuum. Rather, it starts by using whatever information is
immediately available as a reference point or "anchor" and then adjusting." Id at 12.
1
See generally, Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases
(explaining that while heuristics work reasonably well and save time and effort, they
lead to predictable errors) (cited in note 34).
"' See Banaji and Greenwald, Blindspot at 16 (cited in note 36) (discussing how,
when making decisions that involve between choosing between two people, "we rely on
the social group to which the person belongs as a basis for predicting success. Without
recognizing it, we automatically pose and answer questions, such as, 'Are people like him
trustworthy or not? Is the group she comes from smart or dumb? Are people of his kind
likely to be violent or peace-loving?'").
39 See Krieger, 47 Stan L Rev at 1214 (cited in note 32).
1
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the social science research, it is clear that "researchers have
identified the existence and consequence of implicit bias through
well-established methods based upon principles of cognitive
psychology that have been developed in nearly a century's worth
of work." 40
While based on many other social science research
protocols, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) proves that most
people exhibit biases toward certain categories of people,
regardless of any explicit awareness of these preferences.4 1 The
IAT, which measures implicit reasoning, is an empirical tool
used to measure bias. 4 2 By measuring the reaction time and
accuracy by which respondents categorize information, IATs
provide insight into respondents' cognitive processes. 43 For
example, most white Americans respond faster when presented
with "African American" and the word "bad" than "African
American" and the word "good," which reflects negative
automatic associations with African Americans relative to
whites. 4 4 IATs can measure biases in a variety of different
contexts, and some of the more common tests measure biases
towards groups of people based on race, gender, age, disability,
and weight.4 5
The automatic responses that reflect negative judgments
shown by the IAT can have widespread impact in the workplace
environment. Such attitudes manifest themselves in the way
people who hold implicit biases interact with members of that
other group. 6 For example, although unaware of such
behaviors, a person might stand further away, use less eye
contact, judge facial expressions more negatively, and limit
speaking time with individuals from groups against whom

40 John T. Jost, et al, The Existence of Implicit Bias
is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A
Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten

Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 Rsrch Organizational Beh 39, 39 (2009).
41

Banaji and Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People at 41-42 (cited

in note 36).
42 See id at
38-39.
See id.
See id at 46.
41 See, for example, Project Implicit Social Attitudes (Project Implicit 2011), online
at implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/takeatest.html (visited Oct 18, 2014).
46 See Allen R. McConnell and Jill M. Leibold, Relations among the Implicit
43

44

Association Test, DiscriminatoryBehavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37
J Exp Soc Psych 435, 440 (2001).
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implicit bias exists. 4 7 Furthermore, research shows that
members of groups that people tend to hold negative automatic
associations toward are frequent targets of discrimination.4 8
Professor Samuel Bagenstos summarizes and cites to
studies that show how fast thinking results in implicit biases.
Research tools such as the IAT have found that "[w]hite
Americans, on average, show strong implicit preference for their
own group and relative bias against African Americans."4 9
Studies show that whites have similar biases against "other
ethnic minority groups such as Latinos, Jews, Asians, and nonAmericans, as well as the elderly, and women."50
Research also indicates that, in addition to being influenced
by automatic yet negative attitudes, people are generally
unaware of the impact their biases have on their judgment, and
so they cannot bridge the gap between the original stimuli, the
intuitive response, and their ultimate actions. 5 1 Lack of insight
into one's cognitive processes is evidenced by studies of job
candidate evaluations in which decision makers were unable to
faithfully reconstruct what drove their decision to hire one
candidate rather than another. 52
The present hyper level of economic inequality in our society
only makes things worse. Economic inequality generates evergreater levels of individualized, as well as aggregated, social
insecurity. 53 Social science research documents that, as
insecurity rises, so does discrimination:54
See id.
Banaji and Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People at 49 (cited in
note 36).
47

48

49

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1

Harv L & Pol Rev 477, 477 (2007), quoting Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup
Favoritism,and Their BehaviorialManifestations, 17 Soc Just Res 143, 147-48 (2004).
5o See Bagenstos, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev at 477 (citation omitted) ("Interestingly, the
studies also show that minorities and women often harbor the same implicit biases about
their own groups that whites and men harbor against them.").
31 Banaji and Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People at 142-43 (cited
in note 36).
32 See, for example, John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and
Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 Psych Sci 315 (2000) (postulating that a
persistent trend of racial bias in employment decisions, despite decreased levels of selfreported racial bias over the 10-year period from 1989-1999, demonstrated that "the
development of contemporary forms of prejudice, such as aversive racism, may account
... for the persistence of racial disparities in society despite significant decreases in
expressed racial prejudices in stereotypes.").
" See generally Larry Elliot and Dan Atkinson, The Age of Insecurity 287 (Verso
1999). See also Michael J. Zimmer, Inequality, IndividualizedRisk, and Insecurity, 2013
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[R]esearchers gave participants information about the
state of the economy and a particular corporation, and
then asked them to review and rank candidates for a
marketing

position

.. .

who

were

identical

in

qualifications but different by race and gender. When the
participants were told that the economy was in decline,
they were more likely to value the "traditional
applicant"-i.e., white male-rated him more positively,
and rated the Latino female candidate significantly more
negatively; when they were told that the economy was in
upswing, however, they were more likely to value diverse
applicants.55
At least one judge has come to grips with the lack of
awareness about implicit bias. United States District Court
Judge Mark W. Bennett of the Northern District of Iowa has
recognized that implicit bias is such a common phenomenon that
he includes a PowerPoint slide about it that he shows jurors in
all cases he tries before voir dire by the attorneys representing
the parties. 5 6 This helps create a realistic background
assumption about how implicit bias can impact judgments and
decisions even in the absence of any express bias or animus.
While Judge Bennett focuses on the pervasive existence of
implicit bias generally, it is especially significant for groups to
be informed about it in cases dealing with discrimination.
There are, however, skeptics about the scientific validity
and usefulness of social science research that addresses issues
such as implicit bias.5 7 For example, Mitchell and Tetlock argue
that employment managers are not like others who might be

Wis L Rev 1 (2013).
14 See Bornstein, 33 Yale L & Pol Rev at *14-15 (cited in note
4) (describing social
science studies documenting that relying and acting upon biases increases when people
are faced with a perceived threat such as a threat to jobs or resources).
5
Id.
1
Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson,
and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv L & Pol Rev 149, 169 (2010). For a comprehensive
discussion of how social science research dealing with implicit bias has been dealt with
in the courts, see Tanya Kateri Hernindez, One Path for "Post-Racial"Employment
Discrimination Cases - Inserting Implicit Bias Research into Social Framework
Evidence, 32 J L & Ineq (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
1
See, for example, Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock, AntidiscriminationLaw
and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 Ohio St L J 1023, 1023 (2006); Amy L. Wax,
Discriminationas Accident, 74 Ind L J 1129, 1132-33 (1999).
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affected by the effects of implicit bias, but that conclusion has
been rejected because "there is a long and distinguished history
of translating conclusions from basic social psychological
research

. . . into managerial and organizational settings."5 8

Other criticisms are essentially based on differences in
perceptions about the persistence of discrimination rather than
the validity of the social science research itself.59 Some, such as
Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Thompson Ford,6 0 worry that
focusing on implicit bias will shift antidiscrimination law away
from the real world of actual discrimination toward a utopian
goal of eliminating that bias but will leave the world of work
unchanged. 6 1
The Supreme Court has expressed skepticism about the
evidentiary use of some social science research.6 2 Without citing
to the criticisms of Mitchell and Tetlock but perhaps influenced
by them, Justice Scalia, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 63
criticized so-called "social framework" evidence as insufficient to
prove that Wal-Mart's policy of granting unrestricted discretion
to store managers to make pay and promotion decisions
discriminated in the way it operated.6 4 Implicit bias research
can be viewed as a subset of a larger category of social science
called "social framework" theory because it shows the psychology
driving stereotypical thinking and acting. "In employment
litigation, an expert offering social framework testimony will
explain the general social science research on the operation of
stereotyping and bias in decision making and will examine the
policies and practices operating in the workplace at issue to
identify those that research has shown will tend to increase or
3'

59
60

Jost, et al, 29 Rsrch Organizational Beh 39 at 49 (cited in note 40).
See Bagenstos, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev 477 at 490-92 (cited in note 49).
See Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious

Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, andRacial Inequality, 58 Emory L J 1053, 1054 (2009).
61 That view has been criticized as undermining efforts to address structural
discrimination. See Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal
Decisionmaking, 69 Md L Rev 849, 907-08 (2010) ('Addressing the cognitive pathologies
that contribute to biased decisionmaking cannot be the sole objective of
antidiscrimination efforts. The problem is that unless these pathologies are accounted
for and surmounted, the broader structural reforms they seek . . . may never even get off
the ground.").
62 In
an earlier era, social science research was considered useful in
antidiscrimination cases. See generally Betsy Levin, School DesegregationRemedies and
the Role of Social Science Research, 42 L & Contemp Probs 1 (1978).
61 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
64 See id at 2555.
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limit the likely impact of these factors."6 5 Justice Scalia
dismissed the relevance of social framework testimony because
it did not itself prove discrimination:
The only evidence of a "general policy of discrimination"
respondents produced was the testimony of Dr. William
Bielby, their sociological expert. Relying on "social
framework" analysis, Bielby testified that Wal-Mart has
a "strong corporate culture," that makes it "vulnerable" to
"gender bias." He could not, however, "determine with
any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a
meaningful role in employment decisions at Wal-Mart. 66
There was, of course, in the record considerable evidence
that Justice Scalia failed to mention-unchallenged statistical
evidence that women fell far behind men in pay and
promotions-that the policy that was challenged operated in a
very discriminatory way that Wal-Mart knew and did nothing
about. Since he did not look at the statistical evidence that was
most relevant to prove discrimination, Justice Scalia failed to
understand that the social framework evidence was relevant to
understanding whether or not the raw statistical evidence was
sufficient to draw the inference of Wal-Mart's intent to
discriminate. For the purposes of this paper, implicit bias
research, other social science research, including "social
framework" research, and statistical evidence about the
existence of discrimination generally is relevant to establishing
an educated background assessment about the persistence of
discrimination. All of this social science evidence is relevant to
set forth informed, rather than seat-of-the-pants, background
assumptions that help the factfinder decide whether or not to
draw the inference that the challenged action was because of
discrimination. 67

" Melissa Hart and Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment DiscriminationClass Actions, 78 Fordham L Rev 37, 39 (2009).
66 Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2553 (2011).
6
David L Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta, and Cecilia Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit:
The Law of Discriminationand the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L J 1389, 1394
(2008) ("[T]he full research literature amply supports expert opinion regarding implicit
bias and its potential to effect employment decisions. The research, however, focuses on
the phenomenon generally and does not demonstrate that an expert can validly
determine whether implicit bias caused a specific employment decision.").
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In sum, discrimination persists in part because of the way
most people respond to sensory inputs about race, gender, and
other characteristics. The social science research supports the
idea that most people much of the time respond intuitively with
implicit bias and that actions are taken based on that bias even
if the person responding would, perhaps, be able honestly to say
that she was not consciously biased. Thus, the general social
norm now is that it is improper to discriminate. Conscious
discriminators, therefore, remain silent and those who are
subject to implicit bias do not readily express anything that can
be interpreted as biased. Therefore, notwithstanding the
approach of the Court in Wal-Mart, the assumption that
discrimination is a thing of the past is not supportable. Instead,
discrimination persists rather broadly and antidiscrimination
law should reflect this reality and seek to address it.
II. THE INCONSISTENT ANTIDISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE ROBERTS COURT

In order to get a sense of how the Roberts Court has
rewritten antidiscrimination law, this section will start with a
brief sketch of how the two general theories of discriminationdisparate impact and disparate treatment-developed. Then,
the focus will turn to the earlier development of disparate
treatment law-cases where the underlying issue is whether the
employer acted with an intent to discriminate. Next, this section
will describe how the Roberts Court has changed substantive
discrimination law and, finally, how the Court has created
procedural barriers that diminish the opportunity for
discrimination claims to be resolved in court.68
A.

The Pre-Existing Theories for Proving Discrimination

The first Title
Court accepted was
Duke Power Co, 69
excluding African

VII theory of discrimination the Supreme
disparate impact discrimination. In Griggs u
the employer replaced an explicit rule
Americans from any of the better job

See generally Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 162 U Pa L Rev (forthcoming 2014), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2360272 (visited Oct 18, 2014) (discussing how the Supreme Court has
68

narrowed private enforcement of laws generally).
69

401 US 424 (1971).
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categories with a rule setting two qualifications for transfer to
them-having a high school diploma and passing the Wonderlic
pen and pencil multiple choice test. 70 Even though the lower
courts had found as fact that these new qualifications had not
been adopted with an intent to discriminate, the Supreme Court
found that the employer could be liable under a disparate
impact theory that did not include an intent to discriminate
element for Title VII liability.7 1 To make a long story short, in
1991, Congress eventually codified disparate impact theory by
adding § 703(k) to Title VII, which provides:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on
disparate impact is established under this subchapter
only if(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.72
In 1973, the Court interpreted Title VII to include another
theory, disparate treatment discrimination that did include an
intent to discriminate element. 73 Most federal discrimination
cases are claims by individuals that allege intentional disparate
treatment.7 4 The law dealing with disparate treatment has
always been complex and not very clear-cut.7 5 The underlying
See id at 427-28.
See id at 436.
72 42 USC § 2000e-2(k). Even if the employer carries
its affirmative defense, the
plaintiff can still win by proving the existence of "an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice." Id.
7
See McDonnell Douglas Corp u Green, 411 US 792, 802-04 (1973).
74 In 2011, about 65 percent of the almost 100,000 charges filed with the EEOC
involved discharge. See Jill D. Weinberg and Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination,Experience, and JudicialDecisionmaking,85 S Cal L Rev 313 (2012).
7
For my attempts to help clarify the law, see generally Michael J. Zimmer, A
Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination,79 U Colo L Rev 1243 (2008); Michael J.
Zimmer, Charles A. Sullivan, and Alfred A, Blumrosen, Proof & Pervasiveness:
Employment Discrimination in Law & Reality After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa: AALS
Proceeding, 9 Employee Rts & Empl Pol J 427 (2005); Michael J. Zimmer, The New
DiscriminationLaw: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 Emory
L J 1887 (2004); Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An Holistic Approach to
70
71
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question of material fact should be simple: Based on all the
evidence in the record, is it reasonable for the factfinder to draw
the inference that the challenged employer action was motivated
by race, gender, or other characteristic proscribed by Title VII?
In disparate treatment cases, the issue frequently comes down
to a question of fact of whether or not discrimination was "a
motivating factor" of the defendant. 76
Litigating a disparate treatment case, whether for the
plaintiff or the defendant, is a creative act. The evidence in each
case is unique. In every case, it is important for the focus to be
on what evidence would convince a factfinder that "a motivating
factor" for the employer's action was or was not discrimination. 7
Even though each case is likely to be unique, a number of
arguments, singly or in combination, have been made to support
or undermine the conclusion that the employer acted with an
intent to discriminate.7 8
One fundamental argument supporting an inference of
discrimination is unequal treatment.7 9 As the Court said in

InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters u United States:80
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood

type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 Kan J L & Pub Pol 177 (2001); Michael J.
Zimmer Slicing & DicingIndividual DisparateTreatment Law, 61 La L Rev 577 (2001).
7
Section 703(m), 42 USC § 2000e-2(m), provides that liability is established "when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice." The general preponderance of evidence standard is applied to
this question of fact. See Hazen Paper Co v Biggins, 507 US 604, 605 (1993) ("In a
disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the protected trait-under the
ADEA, age-actually motivated the employer's decision.").
7
The "a motivating factor" standard established in § 703(m) is the minimum
necessary to establish liability. It is possible, of course, that a more difficult standard,
such as but-for or even sole cause, could be established. If the factfinder finds that
discrimination was either the but-for or sole cause of the employer's action, then the
same decision affirmative defense to full remedies set forth in § 706(g)(2)(B) would not
apply.
78 All these arguments, and others that can be made, depend on what the evidence
shows. They are not mutually exclusive since the evidence may support drawing the
inference of discrimination based on more than one argument.
79 This article will use "race or gender" as a shorthand for all of the bases of
employer action prohibited by the antidiscrimination statutes.
80

431 US 324 (1977).
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situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.8 1
At the level of individual workers, proof that two workers of
different races were similarly situated-they are comparatorsbut were treated differently by the employer supports drawing
the inference of discrimination. 82 At a systemic level, raw
statistical evidence-in Teamsters, the "inexorable zero" of
African American and Latino over-the-road truck drivers despite
their availability-can be sufficient to support drawing the
inference of discrimination. 83 Furthermore, the use of the
multiple regression statistical technique can establish "matched
pairs" across a significant number of workers by factoring out
the individual variables thought to be relevant, leaving race or
sex as a factor that has a statistically significant relationship to
the job.84 Based on that showing and in absence of any other
explanation, the factfinder may draw the inference that the
difference in treatment among the workers was motivated by
race or sex.
A second basic argument is based on evidence that amounts
to an admission against interest that the employer
discriminated.8 5 For instance, testimony that the employer told
the worker, "I won't promote you because you are a woman,

Id at 335 n 15.
See McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co, 427 US 273, 284 (1976) ("It
may be that theft of property entrusted to an employer for carriage is a . . . compelling
basis for discharge . . . but this does not diminish the illogic in retaining guilty employees
of one color while discharging those of another color."). See generally Charles A.
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discriminationby Comparators, 60 Ala L
Rev 191 (2009).
8'
See Teamsters, 431 US at 337-38, 342 n 23 (holding that the "inexorable zero" of
minority line drivers where qualified drivers were available and willing to take the job
was significant); Hazelwood School District v United States, 433 US 299, 310-13 (1977)
(holding that the shortfall of African American school teachers where they are available
that is demonstrated to be statistically significant can be the basis for drawing the
inference of intentional discrimination).
84 See Bazemore v Friday, 478 US 385, 400 (1986);
D. James Greiner, Causal
Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Harv L Rev 533, 536-37 (2008) (developing a
"potential outcomes" test of statistical evidence as an alternative to binomial distribution
or multiple regression).
"8 See generally Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1989). Until the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to establish the "a
motivating factor" standard of liability that was construed by the Court in Desert Palace
v Costa, 539 US 90, 98-99 (2003) to not include a requirement that "direct" evidence be
shown, the distinction between "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence had been critical
to whether a "but-for" versus the "a motivating factor" standard applied.
81
82
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would be the most clear-cut example. That evidence, if believed
to be true, is powerful circumstantial evidence that the
challenged action was motivated by discrimination. 86 Although
social norms generally now frown on such avowed expressions of
discrimination, 87 this type of blatant discrimination still does
occur and, when it does, evidence that it happened supports
drawing the inference that the employer intended to
discriminate whether or not the speaker was conscious of the
fact that her statements would be perceived as admitting she
discriminated.8 8
One step short of such straightforward admission of animus
is testimony that reveals that the employer based its decision on
thinking grounded in stereotypes about the race or gender of the
worker.8 9 Here, it may not be possible to draw the inference that
the employer was conscious of the fact that it was
discriminating, yet stereotypical thinking can be powerful
evidence that in fact the challenged decision was discriminatory.
Statements that reveal stereotypical thinking are especially
powerful precisely because they are unguarded. Not
understanding that these statements reflect stereotypes that
show the influence of race or sex means that the speaker does
not think that she is violating the social norm against
expressions of discrimination. Thus, the speaker is unaware that
what is being said will be perceived as indicating a
discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, while an action may not
always be consciously discriminatory, it is possible to conclude

86 Admission against interest evidence may be the
best way for a white male
"reverse" discrimination plaintiff to prove his case because the admission, if believed,
overcomes the background assumption that white males are rarely the victims of
discrimination.
87 See Sidhu, 17 U Pa J Const L at *20-23 (cited in note 9) (noting that "[s]uch
negative stereotypes are no longer tolerated. . .").
8
See Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case
Studies in the Preservationof Male Workplace Norms, 9 Employee Rts & Empl Pol J 1, 4

(2005).
89 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US 228 (1989).
Stereotypes are shorthand mental
devices that attribute characteristics to individuals based on their identity. See

Margaret Wetherell, Group Conflict and the Social Psychology of Racism, in Social
Psychology: Identities, Groups, and Social Issues 189 (SAGE 1996) (Wetherell, ed);
Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 192 (Addison-Wesley 1954) (A "stereotype
acts both as a justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, and
as a screening or selective device to maintain simplicity in perception and in thinking.").
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from that evidence, if believed, that the decision was motivated
by race or gender.9 0
A third argument that may be the one most often made to
support drawing the inference of discrimination-based on
McDonnell Douglas Corp u Green 91-is a process of elimination
of the possible non-discriminatory reasons for an action, leaving
discrimination more likely than not as the explanation. 92 When
the usual non-discriminatory explanations for an adverse
employment decision are shown not to apply, it becomes
reasonable for the factfinder to draw the inference that
discrimination was a motivating factor for action that was
taken. 93 Where the plaintiff introduces evidence upon which the
factfinder could conclude that the employer's non-discriminatory
explanation for a challenged decision is not the actual
explanation, "[p]roof that the defendant's explanation is
unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination."9 4

90 A classic example was when 1992 Presidential candidate Ross Perot spoke at the
NAACP national convention. He repeatedly called the audience "you people," and so it
was unmistakable that he viewed African Americans quite differently than the
population generally. See John Broder, NAACP Offers a Chilly Response to Perot Speech
(LA Times July 12, 1992), online at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-07-12/news/mn4266_1_ross-perot (visited Oct 18, 2014).
91 411 US 792 (1972).
92 Given the almost universal reference to McDonnell
Douglas in antidiscrimination
literature, it may seem surprising that little is said about why making out a McDonnell
Douglas case supports drawing the inference of discrimination. This may be a
consequence of treating it and antidiscrimination law generally as being formalistic.
93 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802. Establishing a prima facie case supports
drawing the inference of discrimination because it eliminates the usual reasons for an
action that are not discriminatory, giving the employer the opportunity to introduce
evidence of some additional nondiscriminatory explanations and then allowing the
factfinder to decide whether the action that was challenged was "because of"
discrimination:

The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications. . . . The burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection.
Id at 802.
94

Reees v Sanderson Plumbing Products,Inc, 530 US 133, 137 (2000).
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Fundamentally and based on whatever the arguments have
been made analyzing the evidence in the record, the factfinder
must decide how likely it is that discrimination occurred when
deciding whether discrimination, or some other explanation,9 5 is
the more likely explanation for a challenged action. 96 In making
that determination, the factfinder's assessment of the
background rate of discrimination is important in deciding
whether discrimination occurred in the case to be decided.
Background assumptions always exist in the mental frame of
mind factfinders bring to the job of deciding whether or not
discrimination has occurred.97 A good example of the apparent
influence of a background assumption is the statement by
Justice Scalia in his opinion for the Court in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc v Dukes,98 that most managers would not discriminate in
making pay or promotion decisions: "[L]eft to their own devices
most managers in any corporation-and surely most managers
in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-would select
sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion
that produce no actionable disparity at all."99 There was no
evidence in the record to support his particular background
empirical assumption that discrimination was uncommon, yet
Justice Scalia obviously relied upon it when deciding a case that
95 While the general at-will rule of contract law is phrased to include the possibility
that the employer lacks any reason for taking an action, that would seem to be an
exceptionally rare occurrence since most employment actions are done for a reason.
While the plaintiff has the burden to prove the challenged action was because of race or
gender, an employer would lack a very compelling non-discriminatory explanation by
claiming the act was for whimsy or for no reason at all.
96
See Weiss, 4 Utah L Rev at 1682 (cited in note 12):

In the overwhelming majority of Title VII discrimination cases, the plaintiff's
evidence does not unambiguously establish differential treatment based on
protected class membership. Instead, the plaintiff produces statistical
evidence; comparisons to the employer's treatment of other employees;
evidence that the employer's stated reason was false; statements evincing
improper attitudes; and other evidence that may be strong but that does not
completely foreclose the possibility of non-discrimination.
Id.
97
See id at 1678 ("[T]he elimination of background assumptions is not an option.
Not only when subjective practices are challenged but whenever the factual occurrence of
differential treatment is at issue, triers of fact must make background assumptions
about the societal pattern of discrimination.").
98 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
99 Id at 2554. Social science research suggests that managers, like most others, are
susceptible to implicit bias. See Jost, et al, 29 Rsrch Organizational Beh at 39 (cited in
note 40).
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makes
class actions
more
difficult
for employment
discrimination plaintiffs. Evidence regarding the background
rate of discrimination is therefore relevant in informing the
factfinder in deciding whether or not discrimination occurred.
B.

Changing the Substantive Scope of Antidiscrimination Law

This section begins with what appears to be a surprising
possibility based on a "reverse" discrimination case, Ricci v
DeStefano,10 0 that the white plaintiffs won. Ricci could become
the basis for rejuvenating antidiscrimination law. Following
that optimistic possibility, this section then looks at decisions of
the Roberts Court that cut back on the substantive protections
of Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes.
1.

Using Ricci's "color-blind" test to expand the scope of
Title VII.

Extending Ricci to all disparate treatment cases would
dramatically advance the underlying reason Title VII was
enacted, which was to protect those who are the historic victims
of employment discrimination. Ricci's full potential, if realized,
would revolutionize Title VII law by reducing proof of
discriminatory intent in many cases to a simple factual question
of whether the employer knew the racial or gender consequences
of the action it was taking. 10 1 While expanding the reach of
antidiscrimination law would be very useful given the
persistence of discrimination and would help to rejuvenate the
antidiscrimination project, such a development appears
unlikely, given the direction the Roberts Court has taken in
most of its other decisions dealing with discrimination. Further,
the opinion of the Court in Ricci is so deficient that it might
easily be set aside as simply a product of judicial politics, not
law, similar to the Rehnquist Court's decision in Bush v Gore.102
100

557 US 557 (2009).

101See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci's Color-Blind Standard in a Race
Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L Rev 1257
(developing the point that Ricci could revolutionize Title VII law by reducing proof of
discriminatory intent to a factual question of whether the employer knew the racial or
gender consequences of the action it was taking).
102
531 US 98, 100-11 (2000). In Bush u Gore, the Court acknowledged that its
decision was political by indicating it was not to be viewed as precedent: "Our
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection
in election processes generally presents many complexities." Id at 109. Similarly, the
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In Ricci, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, ruled as a matter of law, that the City of New Haven
had
committed
intentional
disparate
treatment
discrimination. 103 According to the Court, the City violated Title
VII 104 when it decided not to use the results of a written pen and
paper employment test given to firefighters who sought
promotion to lieutenant and captain positions as those positions
became open. 105 The plaintiffs were seventeen whites and one
Latino who would have been promoted immediately if the test
results were used. 106 The City defended its decision by claiming
that its purpose in deciding not to use the test results was to
avoid Title VII disparate impact liability. 107 If the test scores
were used, the City knew that a significantly lower percentage
of African American and Latino test takers would be promoted
than white test takers. Conversely, if the test scores were not
used, a higher percentage of white than African American and
Latino test takers would not be promoted. Some members of all
three groups would be affected positively, others negatively,

Court in Ricci suggested that it was not a normal case by announcing in advance that
any subsequent disparate impact claim against the City based on the same test must
fail:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then
in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid
disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment
liability.
Ricci, 557 US at 593. This seems to be an advisory opinion concerning a case that was
not before it and had not yet been brought in any court. The present Court may no longer
feel the need to even appear to be acting in a judicial manner when making law. Bush v
Gore did not reflect that balance because it was simply a political decision. Nevertheless,
the Court has not appeared to suffer in the general acceptance of its legitimacy. Id at 183
("[T]he public's 'confidence' in the Court actually seemed to increase from 2000 to 2001.").
'os Ricci, 557 US at 592-93.
104
Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78
Stat 241, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2000e-17.
10
The Court reversed summary judgment for the defendants and, in an unusual
move, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. See Ricci, 557 US at 592. To do that,
it had to find that there were no material questions of fact and so plaintiffs were entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. That makes the careful analysis of the opinion in light of
facts the Court found indisputably true and sufficient to support its decision extremely
important.
106
See id at 574.
107
See id at 575. More precisely, in face of the dispute over whether or not the test
scores should be used because of the disparate impact on African American and Latino
test takers, the City's Civil Service Board voted 2-2, which meant that no action was
taken and the proposal to make promotions based on the test scores failed.
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whether or not promotions were made based on the test
scores.108
New Haven had a policy prohibiting discrimination, and
there was no evidence that City officials had admitted by
statements against interests or otherwise that it intended to
discriminate against anyone because of their race. 109 Despite
several days of hearings before the City Civil Service Board, in
which various individuals made a number of different
arguments about whether the test scores should be used, all the
evidence that was relevant to the question of intent to
discriminate was that the test had a clear racial impact whether
it was used or not. 110

The first step in the decision was that the Court found a
conflict between disparate treatment law and disparate impact
law, a conflict that had not previously been seen to exist.1 11
Having created the conflict, the next step required the Court to
construct a way to resolve it. By looking directly to equal
protection law and only indirectly to the statutory defenses in
§ 703(k) of Title VII to a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination, the Court articulated a "strong basis in
evidence" test. 112 Since a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination against minorities had been conceded, the
existence of a defense based on disparate impact law depended
on whether the City had "a strong basis in evidence" to conclude
that it would be liable under the disparate impact theory if it
used the test scores.113 Title VII's § 703(k) sets forth the basic

See id at 566.
Ricci v Destefano, 554 F Supp 2d 142, 162 (D Conn 2006).
no Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, Ricci v Destefano, No 07-1428 & 08-328, *68 (D Conn filed Apr 22, 2009).
n1 In granting summary judgment for the City, the Second Circuit followed
precedent that there was no conflict between the obligations of an employer not to
discriminate intentionally and to decide not to use a practice that caused a disparate
impact unless that practice had been justified as job related and consistent with business
necessity. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Charles A Sullivan, and Rebecca Hanner
White, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination292 (Aspen 8th ed 2013).
112 See Ricci, 557 US at
563.
ns This inverts the normal order of a disparate impact case where the defendant
first resists a finding that the challenged practice resulted in a disparate impact but, if it
did, it would carry the burden of proving that the practice was justified because it was
job related and consistent with business necessity. In this disparate treatment case, the
City would not have to prove that its practice was not job related or was not consistent
with business necessity, but it would have to show that it had "a strong basis in
evidence" that its practice was not defensible.
108
109
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defense standard requiring the employer to prove that the
challenged practice was "job related and consistent with
business necessity."11 4 Even if the challenged practice was found
to be job related and consistent with business necessity, the
practice would still be illegal if the plaintiff could demonstrate
that an "alternative employment practice" existed that served
the interest of the employer but had less adverse impact. 115 But
in the context of defending against a disparate treatment claim
by whites, the City had to prove that it would most likely lose
the disparate impact case. In other words, to win the disparate
treatment case, the City would have to prove it had a "strong
basis in evidence" that the test was not job related or was not
consistent with business necessity. Even if the test was not job
related and was not consistent with business necessity, the City
could still win the disparate treatment case if it could
demonstrate that it would likely lose the disparate impact test
because there was an alternative available that it had not used.
Despite an uncontested showing of a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination that would support a finding of
disparate impact liability and therefore a defense to the
disparate treatment claim, the Court found that there was "no
genuine dispute that the examinations were job-related and
consistent with business necessity." 116 This is quite an
interesting use of language and seems radically at odds with
standard notions of what constitutes a dispute as that term is
used in normal litigation practice. There was no trial in the case,
42 USC § 2000e-2(k). In a case such as this that involves a pen-and-pencil
test,
the issue of job-relatedness and consistency with business necessity resolves down to
whether the test has been properly validated using the techniques of validation
established by Organizational Psychologists. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Features (Biddle Consulting Group
2013), online at http: //www.
uniformguidelines.com/uniformguidelines.html (visited Oct 18, 2014).
n. See 42 USC § 2000e-2(k). Thus, in this inverted setting, the City could concede
that the tests was job related and consistent with business necessity but still assert that
it has "a strong basis in evidence" that an alternative that served its interests but with
lesser impact was available, but it had failed to use it instead of the test it adopted and
administered to make the promotions.
n1 Ricci, 557 US at 587. See also George Rutherglen, Major Issues in the Federal
Law of Employment Discrimination47-48 (U Mich 5th ed 2012) (stating that while this
standard worked to the disadvantage of the City in Ricci where it decided not to use the
test results for fear of disparate impact liability, it would generally work "to the
advantage of employers faced with actual claims of disparate impact. If the employer's
burden is higher to show the absence of a business justification in cases like Ricci, it
must necessarily be lower to show the presence of such a justification in response to a
disparate impact claim.").
114
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but instead it was decided on the motion for summary judgment
based on documents that might or might not have been admitted
as evidence at a trial. Certainly that record did not include all of
the evidence that would have been introduced into evidence if a
trial had been held. What was in the record was the testimony of
various individuals who spoke at a number of hearings before
the City Civil Service Board when it was trying to decide
whether or not to use the test scores. And that testimony was
quite contested as to whether the test was job related or
consistent with business necessity. Further, there was testimony
that alternatives were available-proposals to change the
weight between the oral and written scores on the test or to
replace it with a job assessment system-that would work well
but with less racial impact. 117 In the face of this contested
testimony and claims, the Board did not make a decision;
instead, the proposal to use the test scores failed by a 2-2 split
vote. 118 In face of the failure of the lower courts to sort through
the contested testimony and claims and to decide questions of
fact pursuant to the new law the Court had just created, the
Court should have reversed and remanded the case so an actual
trial could be held with findings of fact and conclusions of law or
jury findings. Instead, the Court reversed the summary
judgment for the City and peremptorily granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs.
While Ricci has been subject to significant and welldeserved critical commentary,1 19 this article will take a different
The Civil Service Board voted 2 to 2, which resulted in the proposal to use the
test scores failing to pass. See Ricci, 557 US at 618.
11
So the Supreme Court, reviewing a record that was not made in a litigation
context with only the default outcome of a split vote decision, essentially acted de novo as
if it were the Civil Service Board. This is not consistent with the Court's role in the
judicial process. Treating the testimony before the Civil Service Board as if it constituted
a trial, including presumably the right to cross examine and impeach and to contest the
admissibility of evidence, seems comparable to treating episodes of the TV show Judge
Judy as real trials.
119 See, for example, Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters
Case & the Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 161 (2011); Richard
Primus, The Futureof DisparateImpact, 108 Mich L Rev 1341 (2010) (viewing Ricci as at
least a partial step toward a "color-blind" standard for both Title VII disparate treatment
law and constitutional equal protection law); Cheryl I. Harris and Kimberly WestFaulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L
Rev 73 (2010) (undertaking a deep and thorough investigation of the case to demonstrate
that antidiscrimination law no longer provides a level playing field for minority plaintiffs
because the law grants white plaintiffs significant advantages). See generally Charles A
Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate
117
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tack, to try to make lemonade out of the Ricci lemon. 12 0 It Will
attempt to show how the approach the Court took in this
"reverse" discrimination case-that establishing intentional
discrimination is a simple question of whether the employer
knew the racial consequences of its action-establishes a new
and potentially quite pro-plaintiff method for proving
intentional discrimination in Title VII cases. The Ricci approach
would add a new, simpler method for determining whether an
action was motivated by race or gender. If this new approach
makes the failure to be blind to race or gender a basis for
deciding whether the employer acted with an intent to
discriminate, that reduces many questions of intent to
discriminate to a simple factual question of whether the
employer knew the plaintiff was a woman or a member of a
minority group when it took the challenged action. 121
The basic insight from Ricci, if applied to disparate
treatment cases in general, could lead to a much broader
substantive application of Title VII in cases where intent to
discriminate is at issue. In short, the Court appears to have
established essentially a "color-blind" standard of disparate
treatment liability for Title VII. 12 2 As the term suggests, this
Impact Road?, 104 Nw U L Rev 411 (2010) (analyzing the effect Ricci has on the
disparate impact doctrine and the relationship between disparate impact and disparate
treatment and suggesting the need for Congressional amendments to Title VII to

overturn Ricci); Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court's 2008-2009
Labor and Employment Cases, 13 Employee Rts & Empl Pol J 253 (2009) (using Ricci as
a prime example of the "procedural extremism" of the Court by reversing summary
judgment for defendant and granting it to the plaintiffs); Susan D. Carle, A Social
Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 U Fla L Rev 251 (2011)
(putting Ricci in context with the background development of the disparate impact

doctrine); Joseph A. Seiner and Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald A New
DisparateImpact?, 90 BU L Rev 2181 (2010) (developing what they see as an emerging
employer affirmative defense to a disparate impact case based on its good faith when it
took an action that has been challenged).
120 Dale Carnegie apparently is the source of this aphorism. See Lemonade Quotes
(BrainyQuote
2014),
online
at
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/
lemonade.html (visited Oct 18, 2014).
121
See Zimmer, BYU L Rev at 1257 (cited in note 101).
122 Justice Kennedy, however, has not yet held that this
"color-blind" approach is
uniformly applicable. In Ricci, he indicated that it does not apply when the employer is
considering what employment practice to use, but the color-blind standard does apply
once it has been adopted and is being administered: "Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that
test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of
their race." Ricci, 557 US at 585. Similarly, in his concurring opinion in ParentsInvolved
in Community Schools v Seattle School District No 1, he held back from adopting the
across-the-board "color-blind" standard that Chief Justice Roberts would have adopted in
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"color-blind" standard requires that an employer literally be
blind to race, to not know the racial consequences of the
individuals adversely affected by employer action. The argument
for applying the "color-or gender-blind" approach generally to
cases not involving white male plaintiffs is simple and
straightforward: If a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination was established in Ricci only because the City
knew that its decision would be adverse to white workers
violates the "color-blind" standard in "reverse" discrimination
cases, a prima facie case would be established if the employer
knew that those adversely affected were workers of color (or
women) in race (or gender) discrimination cases brought by
them.
While much of the rhetoric about a "color-blind" standard
emerged in affirmative action cases, 12 3 Ricci did not involve
affirmative action as that term is usually understood, and it is
that fact that expands the potential of the "color-blind" standard
to be applicable in intentional discrimination cases generally.
There was no express policy using race as was true in the
affirmative action cases, and there was no admission by the City
or its officials that it was expressly using race in the sense that
it was used in those cases. The Civil Service Board simply failed
to take any action on the proposal to use the test scores once it
was known that using the test scores would result in an adverse
impact on the groups of African American and Latino test
takers. Correspondingly, it knew that not using the test would
result in a greater impact on the group of white test takers than
Latinos and African Americans, 124 but the action the plaintiffs
brought claimed intentional, not unintentional, disparate impact
discrimination.

his plurality opinion, leaving open the possibility that a school board could consider race
when it was deciding where to site schools or draw their attendance zones just as long as
that did not extend to deciding where individual students would go to school. See Parents

Involved in Community Schools u Seattle School District No 1, 551 US 701, 782-98
(2007) (Kennedy concurring).
123 See Parents Involved, 551 US at 748, in which Chief Justice
Roberts, closed the
plurality portion of his opinion with a ringing call for a "color-blind" standard: "The way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."
124 The issue whether whites suffering an adverse impact resulting from the
operation of an employment practice is very undeveloped and unclear. See generally

Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by
White Males, 98 Nw U L Rev 1504 (2004).
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In Ricci, the lower courts had granted summary judgment
for the City, finding that there was no material question of fact
that would support a finding that the City had engaged in
intentional discrimination against the white and Latino
plaintiffs. 125 Just knowing that using the test scores would cause
a disparate impact against the groups of African American and
Latino test takers was not a basis to find that deciding not to
use them constituted discrimination against the white test
takers. The lower court's decision was consistent with prior
understandings
that simple knowledge
of the racial
consequences of one's actions did not establish that the action
was taken because of, rather than despite, race, and there was
no other evidence suggested in the summary judgment papers
that would support drawing the inference that the City intended
to discriminate against the plaintiffs.12 6 The Supreme Court
reversed the summary judgment for the City. Rather than
remanding the case for further proceedings to determine
whether or not the City intentionally discriminated, 12 7 the
Supreme Court decided instead to grant the plaintiffs' summary
judgment. 128 So, based on the same record that was before the
lower courts, the Supreme Court determined that the City, as a
matter of law, had intentionally discriminated, but only against
the white firefighters who were adversely affected, and not
against their co-plaintiff who was a Latino as well as another
Latino who would be promoted immediately if the test results
were used and who were exactly similarly situated to the white
plaintiffs but for their race. 12 9 "The City rejected the test results
12'

Ricci, 554 F Supp 2d at 162-63.

126

See PersonnelAdministratorv Feeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979):

"Discriminatory purpose," . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely
"in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Id.
In contrast, in Fisheru University of Texas, 133 S Ct 2411 (2013), the affirmative
action decision, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed the grant of
summary judgment for the University and remanded to the lower court.
128 Just because the defendant was found not to be entitled
to summary judgment
does not mean that the plaintiffs are entitled to it. When summary judgment is denied,
that typically means that there are material questions of fact that foreclose summary
judgment but instead lead to trial.
129 The holding that the white plaintiffs were victims of discrimination
would mean
that those adversely affected by a discriminatory action would benefit from an order to
127
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solely because the higher scoring candidates were white." 130
Absent any evidence other than the City's knowledge that not
using the test would adversely affect some test takers, some of
whom were white and others who were African American or
Latino, the finding is incredible, unless the Court now means
that knowledge of racial consequences of an action that is taken
establishes intent to discriminate. The step Ricci takes is to
extend the "color-blind" standard beyond its prior application
that involved express policies using race positively to benefit
people of color in the Court's affirmative action cases.
The record clearly established that, in addition to the white
plaintiffs, there were two Latino test takers, including one of the
plaintiffs in the action, who would not be promoted and were
exactly similarly situated to the white plaintiffs. There also were
a number of white, Latino, and African American test takers
who were adversely affected because they would have had a
chance for promotion if there were openings in the future while
the test scores would still be used. 131 Given that members of all
use the test scores as part of the remedy would be something like incidental beneficiaries
of the success of the white plaintiffs. The question is why the two Latinos were not just
as much victims of discrimination as the whites. It seems that equal protection and
antidiscrimination have been turned on their respective heads by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, in the academic affirmative action cases where the use of race is justified
because of educational diversity, the primary beneficiaries are the white students whose
education is improved by a diverse educational environment. The students of color who
are admitted are incidental beneficiaries of the benefit their presence provides to the
majority.
"s Ricci, 557 US at 580 (emphasis added).
...The Court showed how the test scores impacted members of the three different
racial groups:
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination-43 whites,
19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed-25 whites, 6
blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight lieutenant positions were vacant at the time of
the examination. As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10
candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were
white. Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black candidates to
be considered for promotion to lieutenant. Forty-one candidates completed the
captain examination-25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22
candidates passed-16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain
positions were vacant at the time of the examination. Under the rule of three, 9
candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to captain-7 whites and
2 Hispanics.
Id at 566. The "rule of three" means that the employer is limited to selecting one of the
top three scorers on the test and cannot move down the rank order list of the test takers
to take someone with a lower score. For the New Haven rule, see City of New Haven
Civil Service Rules *18, online at http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/HumanResources/
CivilService.asp (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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three racial groups were adversely affected by the City's decision
and that some members of those same groups would be
positively affected if the test scores were used, 132 a finding of
intentional discrimination against anyone would need to be
based on other evidence. However, there was no evidence to
support a finding of an intent to discriminate against anyone or
especially against only the white test takers unless the evidence
that knowledge of the racial consequences suffices. The Court
accepted as a fact that there was no evidence supporting a
finding of intent to discriminate against anyone other than the
fact that the City knew some of the white test takers would not
be promoted: "Whatever the City's ultimate aim-however wellintentioned or benevolent it might have seemed-the City made
its employment decision because of race." 133 Since some
members of all three racial groups were both adversely and
positively affected by the decision not to make promotions and
because the record contains no other evidence of animus or an
intent to discriminate against only the white test takers, the
Court could only base its finding of discriminatory intent as a
matter of law solely on the fact that the City knew the racial
impact of its decision as to the members of all three racial
groups. "[A]fter the tests were completed, the raw racial results
became the predominant rationale for the City's refusal to
certify the results." 134 The City violated a "color-blind" standard
since it was not blind to the color of all the test takers.
Therefore, it became liable for intentional discrimination. 135
The Court's decision was not consistent with the evidence
even using its own newly minted "color-blind" standard, since
the Court did not find that all the test takers who were
adversely affected were victims of race discrimination. Given
that there were whites, African Americans, and Latinos who
would be adversely affected if the test scores were not used, it

With members of all three racial groups advantaged and disadvantaged by
whatever decision the City made about using the test scores, it would be difficult to
conclude that there was discrimination against any group absent other evidence that
would support drawing the inference of discrimination against any of the groups or
against any individual members of any of the three racial groups.
1ss Ricci, 557 US at 579-80.
114 Id at
593.
132

.s.Presumably, all the test takers who would have been better off if the test scores
had been used to make promotions would be victims of that intentional discrimination
who would be able to sue using Title VII.
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would be a challenge to find intentional race discrimination
against some members of all three racial groups who took the
test without at least knowing who those successful test takers
were and why the City discriminated against them. Evidence
over and above the fact that the City knew the overall racial
impact would seem to be necessary to be able to find that the
City intended to discriminate against the members of one racial
group but not the other two. That evidence was, as the Court
acknowledged, lacking. 136 Avoiding the dilemma of finding race
discrimination against members in all three racial groups, 137 the
Court instead took an unprecedented leap from reviewing
evidence in the record that showed that the intent of the City
was to avoid an adverse impact on the group of Latino and
African American test takers to a finding as a matter of law that
the decision not to use the test scores was intentional
discrimination but only against those white test takers who
would be promoted if the test scores were not used. 138 Before
Ricci, proof that an actor was simply conscious of the race or
gender of the affected individuals would not by itself support
drawing an inference of the intent to discriminate. For example,

in PersonnelAdministrator u Feeney, 139 an equal protection case,
the Court rejected the claim that knowledge of the consequences
equaled intent to discriminate:
"Discriminatory purpose,"

. . .

implies more than intent

as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the decisionmaker .

.

. selected or reaffirmed

a particular course of action at least in part "because of,"
not merely "in spite of" the adverse affects upon an
identifiable group. 140

Id at 587.
It would seem that the most logical conclusion to be drawn from the fact that
some members of all three racial groups were adversely affected, and the fact that there
was no other evidence that the City intended specifically to discriminate against any
individuals or members of one group, is that there was no intentional discrimination
against anyone. That is what the lower courts had held in Ricci.
"s The leap is from the finding that the decision not to use the scores would have an
adverse impact on all the test takers-white, African American, and Latino-who would
have been either promoted or promotable if the test were used to a finding that the City
committed intentional disparate treatment discrimination to a subset of that group, the
white test takers.
139 442 US 256 (1979).
140 Id at 279. In Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan,
a case involving the
1s6

1s7

19]

TITLE VI'S LAST HURRAH

51

Justice O'Connor,

in her concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse v Hopkins, a Title VII case, made the same point
by making it clear that intent to discriminate could not be based
solely on the fact that the race or gender of the person affected
by the decision is known to the decisionmaker: "Race and gender
14 1

always 'play a role' in . .. the benign sense that these are human
characteristics of which decisionmakers are aware. . . . but by no

means could support a rational factfinder's inference that the
decision was made 'because of' sex." 142 In other words, the
employer may have to know the race or gender of an adversely
affected worker for that worker to prove discrimination but that
knowledge, while necessary, is not sufficient to establish
disparate treatment liability.
Since Ricci, knowledge of the racial consequences of a
potential action is no longer benign. Action taken with that
knowledge is enough to establish an intent to discriminate, since
there was no other basis upon which the Ricci Court could have
made its finding that the City engaged in disparate treatment
discrimination. Because the vote of the Civil Service Board was
two to two, the result was that the resolution to use the test
failed, so no affirmative finding was made by the Board. If
Justice Kennedy's words are taken at face value, the decision
was "because of race" for some of the white test takers, but not
the Latino plaintiff nor the other Latino and African American
applicants who also lost a chance for promotion when the test
was not used. "The City rejected the test results solely because
the higher scoring candidates were white." 14 3
A problem for reading Ricci broadly is that the Court
limited its holding to the white firefighters and did not explain
why the similarly situated Latino plaintiff was not also the

decision by a zoning board to deny a variance to a project to build low income and
racially diverse housing, Justice Powell made clear that adverse impact by itself would
not establish intent to discriminate. See Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan, 429
US 252, 264-65 (1977) ("Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it
results in a racially disproportionate impact.").
141 490 US 228 (1989).
142 Id at 277 (O'Connor
concurring).
143 The Court does not take account of the one Latino,
who would be promoted if the
test scores were used, but who did not join the Ricci suit, nor the other Latino or six
African American test takers who might be promoted if lieutenant or captain positions
opened up during the time period in which the results of this test would be used. Ricci,

557 US 579-80.
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victim of the City's intentional discrimination.1 4 4 Finding that
the Ricci approach to proof of disparate treatment applied only
to claims of "reverse" discrimination brought by whites would be
unequal enforcement in violation of equal protection. Favoring
whites over members of other racial groups could not possibly be
accepted as a compelling governmental interest that would
justify such unequal treatment. 145 On remand, the district court
avoided the most profoundly racist outcome that might have
resulted from the Supreme Court's decision by ordering that the
test results were to be used, rather than just promoting the
white plaintiffs because they were the only victims of intentional
discrimination. As a result, thirteen whites, three African
Americans, and three Latinos were promoted into the openings
that existed at the time the court order was implemented by the
City. 146 This confirms that members of all three racial groups
were adversely affected by the decision not to use the test, but it
also makes suspect the conclusion that the only discrimination
was against the whites.
The exception to the "color-blind" standard that Justice
Kennedy claims to allow for the use of race when planning for
the adoption of new employment practices14 7 would not seem to
apply where, as in Ricci, the knowledge of the racial
consequences came well beyond the planning stage after the test
had been administered. 148 Given that the Court emphasized the
effort the test takers took to prepare for the test, there might be
some type of detrimental reliance limit applied to the "color-

144 Though not based on any evidence in the record, the
majority of the Court is so
convinced that the City was intending to favor minorities, the Latino plaintiff who is by
inference not the victim of discrimination is simply collateral damage to the intensity of
the belief that this case was only about race discrimination favoring minorities.
14'
This result would be extraordinarily disquieting since it raises the specter of
intentional discrimination.
146
See Brodin, 20 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 187 (cited in note 119). The district
court simply ordered that the test scores should be used to make promotions and did not
actually look to directly provide remedies to any of the plaintiffs. As it turned out, ten of
the whites promoted were not original plaintiffs in Ricci, but they got the promotions
because of their scores on the test. The white plaintiffs who were not promoted received
no remedy because their scores were too low to make them promotable.
147
See discussion in note 122.
148 It may be that the dividing line between the planning and administering stage is
when those affected have taken action so that they can claim some sort of detrimental
reliance. It is not clear how this would apply in general employment decisionmaking
because the workers should be able to rely on the employer not to discriminate in any
action affecting the workers.
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blind" standard. But Title VII provides that workers generally14 9
should be able to rely on their employers to not discriminate and
so the border between reliance based on the continued work of
those employees and some special reliance taken such as buying
books and studying to prepare for the test might be difficult to
draw. Perhaps if there had been the upfront commitment to use
the test results no matter what, that might help draw that line,
but that was not the case in Ricci.
The intention of alternative explanations justifying the
restriction of Ricci to claims by whites might be to somehow
limit the case to being a one-off decision with no precedential
effect as the Court claimed to do in Bush u Gore.15 0 In a clumsy
way, Justice Kennedy may have been suggesting such a
distinction when he pronounced, in the fashion of an advisory
opinion, that any subsequent disparate impact action based on
the same test would be futile:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a
disparate-impact suit, then in light of our holding today
it should be clear that the City would avoid disparateimpact liability based on the strong basis in evidence
that, had it not certified the results, it would have been
subject to disparate-treatment liability. 151
As it happens, another firefighter, an African American who
took the test challenged in Ricci, sued on disparate impact
grounds after the test scores were used, claiming that the way
the oral and written scores were weighted, 60 percent written
and 40 percent oral, caused disparate impact and that he would
have been immediately promoted if they were weighted more
evenly since he had the highest oral score of any test takers. 152

149 Applicants that go to the trouble to apply should
be able to have with the
expectation that they will not be discriminated against and incumbent workers do their
jobs also with that expectation.
"o 531 US 98 (2000). Or, since the Court in Ricci acted more like an administrative
agency deciding a question of public policy by majority vote rather than an appellate
court deciding a case or controversy, it might be possible to distinguish it as not being a
judicial proceeding so that it has no significance as precedent as judicial decisions.
...Ricci, 557 US at 593.
112 It is not clear why Briscoe did not rely on disparate treatment for his claim since
it was clear that the City knew the racial consequences of the test when it finally
implemented and Briscoe was adversely affected by that action.
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In Briscoe v New Haven, 153 the district court followed Justice
Kennedy's advisory opinion and dismissed the case. 15 4 The
Second Circuit reversed, applying the general legal principle
that someone who is not party to a decision is not estopped from
bringing a separate claim. 155
It might be possible to explain Justice Kennedy's decision
that only white firefighters were the victims of discrimination as
a slip of the pen. That when he wrote "white" he meant to
include at least the one Latino plaintiff. Accepting that as a slip
of the pen would still leave open the problem of the other Latino,
who would be promoted immediately if the test results were
used but who did not join the lawsuit, as well as the other white,
Latino, and African American test takers who did well enough
that they would have a chance for promotion during the time
period when the test scores would still be used. 15 6 Given the lack
of any explanation, the slip may not have been of the pen, but it
could well have been the result of implicit bias based on the
stereotype that is not negative to minority firefighters but
instead is positive, that firefighting lieutenants and captains are
white. 157
..
s 654 F3d 200 (2d Cir 2011).
14
iscoe u City of New Haven, 2010 WL 1719311 (D Conn 2010), corrected and
superseded, 2010 WL 2794231 (D Conn 2010).
...Briscoe, 654 F3d at 204-05. The Supreme Court refused to grant cert. See City of
New Haven u Briscoe, 132 S Ct 2741 (denying petition for writ of certiorari). See also
Andrew Seidman, Supreme Court Won't Revisit New Haven Firefighter Case (Wall St J
2012), online at http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/06/11/supreme-court-wont-revisitnew-haven-firefighter-case (visited Oct 18, 2014). Subsequently, the district court has
allowed Briscoe to amend his complaint. See Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint, online at http://scholar.google.com/scholar casecase=699074273
8994759007&hl en&as sdt=2&as vis=1&oi scholarr (visited Oct 18, 2014). Briscoe is
still on the agenda of New Haven's Civil Service Board. See also New Haven Civil Service
Meeting Agenda, online at http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/HumanResources/pdfs/
Notice% O20Meeting% 20March% 2026.% 202013.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
Even without bringing an action, this firefighter was a beneficiary of the way the
district court handled the remand from the Supreme Court by simply ordering that the
test results be used, without regard to whether or not those benefitted had been parties
to the lawsuit or not.
17 Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Ricci seems even more open to being
understood as reflecting implicit bias than the opinion of Justice Kennedy. Ricci, 557 at
596-608 (Alito concurring). He was convinced that the reason the City did not use the
test is that it caved into political pressure by a local community leader who happened to
be an African American. See id at 604-05 (Alito concurring). Justice Alito was convinced
that this made the decision because of race while preexisting precedent would treat
caving into political pressure to be the motivating intent, not race discrimination. See id
at 607-08 (Alito concurring). If Justice Alito could command the majority to take this
extremely radical expansion of what constitutes intent to discriminate, the worst fears of
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At first blush, it might appear that under Ricci employers
would be liable for every adverse employment action they take
because they almost always know the race and gender of the
affected workers. That would seem to be the result of Ricci if
employers fail to take action to blind themselves to the race or
gender of applicants or workers who will be subjected to an
adverse employment action. To avoid disparate treatment
liability pursuant to the "color-blind" standard, employers would
be required to blind themselves to the race or gender
consequences of the decisions they make: Knowledge of the
unequal racial impact of a challenged action affecting
individuals would, without more, trigger liability by establishing
that race was "a motivating factor" for the employer's decision
unless the employer had "a strong basis of evidence" that it
would violate the law if it did not act in light of that knowledge.
Hiring blind to race or sex is at least possible in many
situations. For example, symphony orchestras increased the
chances that women would be hired as members when the
auditions were blind as to the identity of the candidates when
they auditioned. 15 8 Even if the initial stages of employee
selection were not blind as to race or sex, 15 9 a hierarchical
system where the person actually making the employment
decision was blind to the race or gender of the affected
individuals might shelter the employer from liability under the
"color-blind" standard. 160
Taking the "color-blind" standard beyond challenges to
affirmative action plans means that Ricci can apply in most
disparate treatment discrimination claims since the employer
knows the race or gender of workers when it makes adverse
employment decisions. Making this argument successfully in
cases other than those brought by whites would resuscitate Title
the Court in the earlier cases, that equal protection claims would be raised in virtually
every governmental action or failure to act, would likely be realized.
"s See generally Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse, OrchestratingImpartiality: The
Impact of'Blind"Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Am Econ Rev 715 (2000).
19 According to Justice Kennedy, at a planning stage, the likely racial consequences
of a proposed employment policy or practice can be taken account of by the employer
without triggering disparate treatment liability. See Ricci, 557 US at 585.
160 See Staub u Proctor Hospital, 131 S Ct 1186, 1193-94 (2011) (addressing "cat's
paw" liability in an employer hierarchy). While implicit bias may well influence actions
early in the process, splitting that step from the final decision making step might
insulate the conduct from attack, except, perhaps, by relying on a disparate impact
theory attacking the process as having an adverse impact. 42 USC § 20000e-2(k).
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VII law. 161 The direction of some other cases by the Roberts
Court, however, makes it unlikely that the Court would
consistently apply this new and powerful "color- or genderblind" standard in antidiscrimination cases. The next subsection
deals with those decisions.
2.

Roberts Court decisions diminishing Title VII's
substantive protections.

While exploring Ricci's implications could expand the rights
protected by Title VII, other decisions by the Roberts Court have
weakened those protections. This section will review recent
decisions that have a negative impact on antidiscrimination
enforcement dealing with systemic disparate treatment,
systemic disparate impact, and the causation standard to prove
intentional discrimination.
As mentioned above, Wal-Mart1 62 involved a putative class
action of over one and a half million women workers claiming
sex discrimination in terms of pay and promotions. Although the
Court refused to certify this suit as a class action under Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and so it would properly
be read as "only" involving class action procedure, this decision
is also significant because it may signal that the longestablished systemic disparate treatment discrimination
precedent may be in jeopardy. 163
In Wal-Mart, there was stark statistical evidence in the
record of the failure of women to be rewarded with pay or
promotion as compared to men. The majority opinion does not
even mention these facts. The evidence showed that women
filled 70 percent of the hourly jobs but only 33 percent of
16 For a court not to accept this new approach in cases brought by the historic
victims of discrimination would require an interesting legal analysis.
162 131 S Ct 2541 (2011). The possible substantive implications
of Wal-Mart will be

discussed here. Later, its implications for class action law will be developed.
16 Deciding whether or not to certify the class, the
Court said:
[W]ill entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff s' underlying claim.
That cannot be helped. "[T]he class determination generally involves
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising
the plaintiff s' cause of action. . . . In this case, proof of commonality necessarily
overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a
pattern or practice of discrimination."
131 S Ct 2541, 2251-52, quoting General Telephone Co of Southwest a Falcon, 457 US
147, 160 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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management jobs, with most promotions coming from the pool of
hourly workers. Furthermore, it took women longer than men to
rise into the management ranks, and the higher one looked in
the management hierarchy the fewer the jobs filled by women.
Finally, women were paid less than men in every region and
that salary gap widened over time, even for men and women
hired into the same jobs at the same time. 164 Thus, women
employees were adversely affected by the way in which the WalMart policy allowed store managers relatively free discretion.
Whether or not any individual woman was a victim of pay or
promotion discrimination because of decisions made by her store
manager, all women working at the local stores faced the risk
that their managers would discriminate against them because of
their sex, and Wal-Mart would do nothing about the actions of
its agents. A data driven company, Wal-Mart collected all of this
information about pay and promotion and aggregated it; so WalMart knew the adverse impact its policy of granting discretion
had on the women working in its stores.
In Wal-Mart's systemic disparate treatment claim, as in an
individual disparate treatment case, the ultimate question was
whether the adverse action being challenged-the shortfall of
women in terms of their pay, promotion and positions-was
"because of" sex discrimination. The first step toward answering
that question is to decide whether there are any policies of the
employer that are express statements of discrimination. 165 The
Court discussed two Wal-Mart policies. One expressly prohibited
discrimination, 166 and the other was Wal-Mart's policy of giving
unstructured discretion to the managers of individual stores to
set pay within certain ranges and to make promotions. 167 While
both policies were express, neither was discriminatory on its

The opinion of the Court in Wal-Mart did not mention these statistics that start
the analysis of a systemic disparate treatment challenging an employer's pattern or
practice of discrimination, but Justice Ginsburg did quote the district court's finding of
facts. See Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct 2541, 2562-64 (2011) (Ginsburg dissenting).
1
For an example of an employment policy that was expressly discriminatory, see
Automobile Workers u Johnson Controls, Inc, 499 US 187, 211 (1991) (holding that
excluding fertile women but not men from jobs involving exposure to lead is an express
policy of sex discrimination).
166 Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2553 ("Wal-Mart's announced policy forbids sex
discrimination.") (emphasis in original).
167 See
id at 2554 ("The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs' evidence
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart's 'policy' of allowing discretion by local supervisors
over employment matters.").
164
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face, which, according to Judge Ikuta in her dissent below,
would all but end the matter. 168 Although not expressly adopting
Judge Ikuta's elimination of an employer's liability for pattern
or practice cases of disparate treatment, Justice Scalia did quote
her opinion favorably, which might foreshadow a future
direction of the Court to eliminate pattern or practice cases of
disparate treatment discrimination. 169
Absent a policy that discriminates on its face, the second
step in analyzing a systemic disparate treatment claim is to
look, not at the express policies of the employer, but at how
those policies are implemented or administered. 170 A policy of
unstructured decision making as alleged in Wal-Mart is the type
of subjective decision making the Court, in Watson v Fort Worth
Bank & Trust,171 had found to be subject to potential disparate
impact liability.172 While the pay and promotion decisions were
made by the local store managers, the systemic disparate
treatment claim was against Wal-Mart itself because it created
and continued a policy even after knowing of the result of the
operation of the policy to be a dramatic difference between the
pay and promotions of men and women workers in its stores. It
was clear that Wal-Mart had collected and aggregated that
information from all the decisions made in all its stores. While
not all women had received lower pay or had been denied
promotions because of their sex, all the women workers were
adversely affected by the policy's pattern of operation. All the
161 Judge Ikuta, in her dissent below, would narrow systemic disparate
treatment
claims to express policies of discrimination and to situations where a policy neutral on
its face was shown to have been adopted by top management with an intent to
discriminate. See Dukes u Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 603 F3d 571, 632-33 (9th Cir 2010)
(Ikuta dissenting), revd 131 S Ct 2547 (2011). See also Tristin K. Green, The Future of
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berkeley J Employ & Labor L 395 (2011)
(criticizing the reliance on the mere existence of a formal employer nondiscrimination
policy to rebut statistical evidence of a pattern or practice of disparate treatment
discrimination).
169 Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2555.
170 See Teamsters, 431 US at
349-50.
17' 487 US 977, 990 (1988) ("[A]n employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to
the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of
discriminatory conduct.").
172 While Watson was a disparate impact case, presumably the policy of using
discretion can also be the focus of a disparate treatment claim if it could be shown that
its operation or administration was the product of an intent to discriminate. Even if the
evidence in the record would not support drawing the inference that the practice was
intentional discrimination, the practice could be challenged using the separate disparate
impact theory set forth in § 703(k), 42 USC § 2000e-2(k).
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women working at all the local stores faced an identical risk:
that their managers would discriminate against them and that
Wal-Mart would do nothing about it despite knowing the
disadvantaged position of women overall.
Enduring the risk of discrimination is itself discrimination.

In International Union, UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc, 17 3 the
employer, a manufacturer of car batteries, excluded all fertile
women workers from any jobs that involved exposure to lead or
that could lead to jobs with lead exposure.1 74 Some women
workers lost their jobs because of the policy (or they got
themselves sterilized in order to keep the job they had); others
would have their opportunities limited because the rule would
prevent them from transferring into jobs that involved exposure
or that would involve a progression leading to lead exposure
jobs. 175 All the women in the class were exposed to the risk that
they would be victims of discrimination just as all the Wal-Mart
women faced the risk that their store manager would
discriminate against them in pay and promotions.17 6
Nevertheless, the Court in Wal-Mart refused to accept the class
claim based on the precedent from Johnson Controls. That
might mean that in the future the Wal-Mart holding as to
procedural class action law might be claimed to undermine the
substantive precedent for challenging pattern or practice
liability based on a showing of such substantial unequal
treatment of women workers.
Although Ricci involved race and Wal-Mart involved claims
of gender discrimination, there are strong similarities that
would support finding that Wal-Mart engaged in intentional
disparate treatment discrimination. Neither case involved an
express policy that discriminated, and both had express nondiscriminatory policies. So, both involved employment practices
neutral on their face as to race or gender that nevertheless had
adverse effects, on African American and Latinos in Ricci and on
women in Wal-Mart. Both involved promotions and both

499 US 187 (1991).
See id at 192.
175 Id.
176 One difference in the two cases is that Johnson Controls
involved an express
policy of discrimination, while Wal-Mart involved the discriminatory operation of a policy
that on its face was neutral as to gender, and Wal-Mart had an express policy
prohibiting discrimination.
17s
174

60

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

involved the employers knowing of the adverse impact. 177 Both
involved disparate treatment claims requiring proof of the
employer's intent to discriminate. The difference in outcome is
stark. In Ricci, the employer is liable for intentional disparate
treatment discrimination as a matter of law to all but one of the
plaintiffs because it failed to use test scores that would have led
to their promotion.178 In Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs were found to
have failed to even raise a common question of fact as to
whether the operation of the challenged policy constituted
intentional disparate treatment discrimination, even though the
knowledge of the gender impact of the way the policy worked
was known to the employer. 179
The failure of the Court to carry over the learning from
Ricci to Wal-Mart may be because the majority in Wal-Mart did
not have the same the kind of empathy toward the women class
members that it exhibited toward the test takers in Ricci.1o

177 When the issue of the use of the test arose in Ricci, the City
did not know the
scores of the individual test takers while there was no indication that the identity of the
individual women who were adversely affected by the operation of the challenged policy
could be attributed to Wal-Mart itself.
178 As it turned out in Ricci, when the City was ordered to use the test scores, six of
the original plaintiffs had failed the test or had scored too low to be promoted. Their
claims for promotion in the remand proceedings were rejected. See Brodin, 20 S Cal Rev
L & Soc Just at 187 (cited in note 119).
179 The slippery slope that is Ricci can be seen by thinking
what would have
happened if Wal-Mart had taken action to reduce the impact of its policy of discretion.
Would that mean that men who would be comparatively adversely affected by those
actions have a Ricci disparate treatment case because Wal-Mart would know the gender
consequences of that action?
18o The description that appears empathetic could be viewed as being directed
toward all the test takers. While that may be so, the result of the case-claiming that
only some white test takers were discriminated against-suggests that the empathy was
meant for only those whites.

The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the
candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City
had established for the promotional process. Many of the candidates had
studied for months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus
the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the
process was all the more severe.
Ricci, 557 US at 593. At least some members of the Senate think that Justices on the
Supreme Court should not be empathetic. See John Paul Rollert, Justice Sotomayor - not
guilty of 'empathy' (Christian Science Monitor Aug 29, 2011), online at http: //www.
csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0829/Justice-Sotomayor-not-guilty-of-empathy
(visited Oct 18, 2014). So any further expression of empathy on behalf of anyone by any
member of the Court may be unlikely. One would hope, however, that, whether
expressed or not, all the members of the Court should be empathetic with all the parties
to every case before the court. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34
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Even in absence of any discernible empathy for the Wal-Mart
plaintiffs,181 however, it is long accepted that an unexplained
violation of equal treatment is prohibited intentional
discrimination. 182 Despite unequal treatment being claimed as
the essence of disparate treatment discrimination, the Court
nevertheless failed to analyze the case in terms of existing
precedent even though in the procedural posture of its decision
it had to assume the claim of unequal treatment by the women
workers was true. 183 In sum, Wal-Mart u Dukes is a class action
case, but it appears to be based on assumptions about
substantive systemic disparate treatment law that narrow that
law to make it more difficult to prove intentional discrimination
when the operation of an employer policy is challenged as
discriminatory, at least when women claim discrimination. 184
Other substantive decisions by the Roberts Supreme Court
make it clear that it has made discrimination claims by those for
whom the antidiscrimination statutes were primarily enacted
more difficult. In 2009, in Gross v FBL FinancialServices, Inc, 185
an individual disparate treatment age discrimination case, the
Court made all claims of intentional age discrimination more
difficult to prove. 186 It required that age discrimination must be
proved by the "but-for" test of linkage between the adverse
action plaintiff suffered and the defendant's intent to

Colum Hum Rts L Rev 575 (2003).
18
Lurking beneath the differences in expressions of empathy may be stereotypes
based on implicit bias about the proper roles for men as managers and women as
subordinate workers.
182
See Teamsters, 431 US at 335 n 15:
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment.
Id.
See McDonald, 427 US at 283 (stating that the employer may decide "that
participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for employment,
this criterion must be 'applied, alike to members of all races,' and Title VII is violated if
18

...

it was not.").

The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart claimed only intentional discrimination. But the
challenge could have been based on disparate impact claim, though Justice Scalia in his
concurrence in Ricci suggests that the disparate impact provision in Title VII, § 703(k),
violates equal protection.
184

18

557 US 167 (2009).

186

See id at 177-78.
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discriminate and not the more pro-plaintiff "a motivating factor"
standard. 187 It took two steps to reach that result, the first of
which was not a surprise but the second one was. First, the
Court rejected the use in Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) cases of the "a motivating factor" test of liability and the
same-decision defense to full remedies that Congress had added
to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 199 1.188 Applying a plain
meaning approach, the Court held that since the 1991 Act
amended the Age Discrimination Act in some ways but did not
include the ADEA in its adoption of the "a motivating factor"
standard for Title VII, that standard did not apply to ADEA
cases. 18 9 The second, surprising step was to reject the burdenshifting approach the Supreme Court had found to apply to Title
VII cases in its 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse.19 0 Taking that
second step undermined the longstanding interpretation of
antidiscrimination statutes in a uniform way so as to maximize
the protection available to the classes protected by those laws. 191
As a result, discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, and disability can be established using the "a
motivating factor" standard of liability, while in cases claiming
age discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that age was the
"but-for" cause of the adverse action of employer vis-A-vis the
plaintiff. Given the failure of the Court to justify its result in
face of precedent, it appears that the Court simply devalued
claims of age discrimination, assuming that age discrimination
had dissipated or that it was a less significant problem than

187

See id.

188 § 703(m), 42 USC § 2000e-2(m), establishes the "a motivating factor" test of
liability, while § 706(g)(2)(B), 42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), provides an affirmative defense
to full remedies if the defendant can prove that it "would have taken the same action in
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor."
189 See Gross, 557 US at 179 n 5. The Rehnquist Court had earlier treated systemic
disparate impact law differently in Title VII and the ADEA in part because the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 had codified disparate impact law for Title VII by adding § 703(k), 42
USC § 20002-2(k), but had not included the ADEA in that codification. See Smith v City

of Jackson, 544 US 228, 240-41 (2005).
190 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US 228, 291-92 (1989).
The essential difference
between Price Waterhouse's interpretation of § 703(a)'s "because of" language and
§ 703(m) and § 706(g)(2)(B) is that the same-decision affirmative defense in Price
Waterhouse was a defense to liability while under the new statute it would only be a
defense to full remedies. See 42 USC §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
191 Since the Court in Price Waterhouse had interpreted "because of" in Title VII to
mean the motivating factor/same decision defense to liability, the argument is that the
same approach would apply to the term "because of" in the ADEA.
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other bases of discrimination such as race or gender. 192 It now
can be seen as foreshadowing the further cutback of
antidiscrimination law.
The next case involving the interpretation of "because of"
reached a similar result as in Gross-"because of" means "butfor." To reach that result, however, the Court had to run
roughshod over the interpretive techniques it had claimed to
have relied on in Gross. In 2013, in University of Texas

Southwestern Medical Center u Nassar,193 the Court held that
the "a motivating factor" level of proof to establish liability set
forth in § 703(m) 194 and the same-decision defense to full
remedies of § 706(g)(2)(B) 195 do not apply to claims of retaliation
brought pursuant to § 704(a) of Title VII. 196 Instead, Title VII
retaliation, like all claims of age discrimination after Gross, now
must be proven to be the "but-for" cause of the adverse action
the plaintiff challenges. That means that only Title VII claims of
intentional discrimination in hiring, promotion, discharge, etc.,
that are prohibited by § 703(a) can utilize the more plaintifffriendly "a motivating factor" test of § 703(m).19 7 To reach the
result it wanted, which was to narrow antidiscrimination law,
the Court could not rely on the plain meaning approach it had
claimed to use in Gross and in Desert Palace, Inc v Costa,198 an
Looking back at Price Waterhouse, Justice Thomas declared that "it is far from
clear that the Court would have the same approach were it to consider the question
today in the first instance." Gross, 570 US at 168.
193 133 S Ct 2517, 2531-34 (2013). Another case decided the same
day as Nassar is
another example of the Court pruning back the substantive scope of Title VII. In Vance v
Ball State University, 133 S Ct 2434 (2013), the Court cut back the definition it earlier
had created in Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998) and Faragherv
City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775 (1998), of the term "supervisor" for purposes of
determining whether the employer was directly liable for that worker's harassment of
the plaintiff. A supervisor is now an individual authorized to undertake or recommend
tangible employment decisions affecting the employee, including hiring, firing,
promoting, demoting, and reassigning the employee but not merely if the individual is
authorized to direct the employee's daily work activities. An employer is only liable for
its negligence in allowing a harassing worker with authority to direct the work of the
plaintiff actual work. That authority provided by the employer does not sufficiently aid
the employee in his harassment.
194 42 USC § 2000e-2(m).
192

42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
197 For a critique of Nassar, see generally Michael J. Zimmer,
Hiding the Statute in
Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 Nev L
J (forthcoming 2014) (on filed with author).
198 539 US at 98-101 (holding that the plain meaning of § 703(m) makes clear that
there is no direct evidence threshold to use of its "a motivating factor" standard).
195
196
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earlier Title VII case also interpreting §§ 703(m) and
704(g)(2)(B). The plain meaning approach would be that
retaliation is an "unlawful employment practice" as described
and prohibited by § 704(a), which can be proved using the "a
motivating factor" standard. That is because § 703(m) applies to
all of Title VII's "unlawful employment practices" with no
suggestion that it makes a difference whether they are included
in § 703(a) or § 704(a). Perhaps even more significant, the Court
had to make a tortured interpretation of a well-established
string of precedents that all had viewed retaliation as one form
of discrimination just like other forms of discrimination, such as
hiring or firing discrimination, and thus subject to the same
methods of proof.199 By undermining those decisions, which were
based on the interpretation of a number of different statutes, the
Court further undermined what had been a long standing
approach of reading antidiscrimination statutes uniformly to
provide expansive protection for those for whom the statutes
were enacted.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Nassar, appears
to acknowledge that the decision to make § 704(a) violations
harder to prove was the Court's policy judgment that too many
retaliation claims are being brought: "[C]laims of retaliation are
being made with ever-increasing frequency." 200 That increase in
claims would be exacerbated because "lessening the causation
standard [by applying the "a motivating factor" test] could also
contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon
resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and
courts to combat workplace harassment." 20 1 While the number of
claims of retaliation had been increasing, there was no evidence
in the record or elsewhere that the number or the rate of
frivolous retaliation cases had increased. 202

199

See generally CBOCS West, Inc u Humphries, 553 US 442 (2008); G6mez-Pirez u

Potter, 553 US 474 (2008); Jackson u Birmingham Board of Education, 544 US 167
(2005); Sullivan u Little HuntingPark, Inc, 396 US 229 (1969).
200 Nassar, 133 S
Ct at 2531.
201 Id at 2531-32.
202 In absence of evidence of an increase in the rate
of frivolous cases, the fact that
more retaliation cases are filed says nothing about the rate of those cases. At any rate,
issues arising out of data concerning the rate of retaliation cases or of frivolous cases
would be for Congress to address, not for the Court to simply rewrite the legislation by
judicial fiat.
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In absence of any evidence in the record to support its policy
judgment, the Court appeared to rely on a clever hypothetical
situation posed by the employer's counsel during oral argument
suggesting that workers will game their employers to avoid
adverse but not discriminatory employment actions by
strategically filing unfounded discrimination claims followed by
retaliation claims:
Consider in this regard the case of an employee who
knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor
performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just
transferred to a different assignment or location. To
forestall that lawful action, he or she might be tempted to
make an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious
discrimination; then, when the unrelated employment
action comes, the employee could allege that it is
retaliation.203

That this hypothetical was so effective and yet was not based on
any empirical evidence of such gaming suggests the importance
of the background assumptions that decision makers bring to
their decisions. 204 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg confirmed that
the majority in Nassar made a policy decision to restrict the
scope of the protections provided by antidiscrimination law:
"[T]he Court appears driven by its zeal to reduce the number of
retaliation claims filed against employers. Congress had no such
goal in mind when it added § 703(m) to Title VII."205
In sum, the Roberts Court has expanded the interpretation
of Title VII from affirmative action cases to "reverse"
discrimination cases so that an employer is at least liable for
disparate treatment discrimination simply because it knows
203 Nassar, 133 S Ct at 2532. Counsel raised this hypothetical in his
oral argument.
See Oral Argument Transcript, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v
Nassar, No 12-484, *22-23 (US Apr 24, 2013) ("Transcript"). Justice Alito did the same.
See Transcript at *30-31 (cited in note 203). Justice Scalia opined that the employee
would win the retaliation case if this hypothetical were a real case. Id at *32. But this
appears to be strictly a hypothetical possibility since there was no record before the
Court of such a fact pattern in any reported cases. See generally Zimmer, 14 Nev L
J (cited in note 197).
204 The
assumption that workers know their rights and manipulate claims
strategically may be a product of stereotyping since it is at odds with reality. See Pauline
T. Kim, Norms, Learning and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal
Knowledge, 1999 U Ill L Rev 447, 448-53 (1999).
205 Nassar, 133 S Ct at 2547 (Ginsburg
dissenting).
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that white workers will be adversely affected by its action. But
the Court has yet to apply that same simple and straightforward
"color-blind" standard for determining what constitutes intent to
discriminate when the plaintiffs are women complaining of sex
discrimination, even though it could have done so in WalMart.206 Further, the Court appears to have decided that, as a
policy matter and in the context of cases brought by the historic
victims of discrimination, enforcement of the antidiscrimination
statutes has been too broad. In short, Title VII and other
antidiscrimination statutes have been narrowed by the Court's
substantive interpretations that reduce the possible scope of
enforcement of these statutes, even if that narrowing could not
be achieved through the consistent application of the canons of
statutory interpretation that it claimed to be applying earlier.
Unless the courts decide to revive antidiscrimination law by, for
example, using the pro-plaintiff potential of Ricci, the
antidiscrimination project is being winnowed away toward
nothing. If that is not clear based on the restrictions of the
substantive scope of these laws, the next section will show how
the Court is acting to end the antidiscrimination project through
its interpretation of procedural rules as they apply to statutory
discrimination claims.
C.

Procedural Bars to the Enforcement of Title VII

The Supreme Court has recently promulgated new
procedural rules that, as a practical matter, severely limit the
ability of employees to challenge the employment discrimination
they suffer. 207 The Roberts Court got off to an inauspicious
beginning with its decision in Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co, Inc. 2 08 In Ledbetter, the Court time-barred the
See generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, Is the 'Post" in Post-Racial the "Blind" in
Colorblind?,32 Cardozo L Rev 807 (2011).
207 For an empirical study demonstrating the retrenchment of regulation through
private litigation since the era of President Reagan, see Burbank and Farhang, 162 U Pa
L Rev at *59 (cited in note 68):
206

Litigation seeking to narrow private rights of action, attorney's fees, and
standing, and to expand arbitration, achieved growing rates of voting support
from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, particularly once the
Republicans gained control of Congress and there was no longer, as in 1999, a
credible threat of statutory override.
Id.
208

550 US 618, 642 (2007) (holding that the filing period for EEOC claim runs even
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plaintiff's claim even though the discriminatory acts that started
the running of the filing period had occurred long before plaintiff
had any notice of the discrimination. 2 09 Given that only the most
cynical view of Congressional intent would think such an
interpretation was possible, it may not be surprising, but it is
fortunate that Congress overturned Ledbetter.2 10 Nevertheless,
the Ledbetter decision did not bode well for subsequent
procedural issues arising in discrimination cases decided by the
Roberts Court.
This section will trace three subsequent developments in
procedural law involved in discrimination cases. First, the Court
has created a new arbitration law out of whole cloth that diverts
workers' claims of discrimination from the courts to arbitration
even in absence of any consent by the worker or in absence of a
truly voluntary decision by the employee to choose arbitration.
Second, for any statutory case that escapes arbitration, the
Court has heightened pleading standards to allow for the
dismissal of cases before discovery has occurred rather than by
summary judgment after discovery is complete. Third, the Court
has substantially narrowed the availability of class actions in
discrimination cases in court while presuming that arbitration
agreements cut off the ability to bring collective actions in
arbitration or court.
1.

Enforcing "arbitration" that is non-consensual.

Arbitration is an agreement by parties to a dispute or to a
potential dispute that might arise in the future to resolve it
outside court and in a private forum decided by a private
arbitrator or arbitrators. It is justified because, as with any
other contract, arbitration is based on the notion of mutual
consent. 211 By forcing statutory disputes into arbitration, the
in absence of any knowledge by the employee that she has been discriminated against).
209
See id at 642.
210
Congress overturned Ledbetter with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Ac, Pub L No
111-2, 123 Stat 5 (2009), codified at 29 USC §§ 626, 794a and 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(3).
211 A section of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 2, describes arbitration as
contracts:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
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Supreme Court has taken major steps to "privatize" the
resolution of statutory employment disputes, including Title VII
claims. 2 12 The Court's policy preference for keeping statutory
discrimination cases out of court is so strong that it has now
taken to forcing cases into arbitration even in absence of any
consent of the claimants or of their actual voluntary consent.
That policy, which favors pouring claims out of court and into
arbitration, has now gone so far as to force statutory claimants
into arbitration even if they are not parties to any arbitration
agreement. 2 13 In 14 Penn Plaza v Pyett,214 the Court held that
union and management could, based on the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement between those two parties, require
individuals represented by the union to arbitrate their statutory
antidiscrimination claims, even though the employees were not
party to the collective bargaining agreement and had never
agreed to any arbitration agreement of any kind with the
employer or the union. 2 15 Because membership in a collective
bargaining unit is based on majority rule, some members of the
unit may have not consented to any union representation. While
the union has a right to advance claims based on the collective
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
See also Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration: International Commercial Arbitration 2 (Cambridge 2d ed 2012)
(establishing that the defining characteristics of arbitration include consent: "The parties
consent provides the underpinning for the power of the arbitrators to decide the
dispute.").
212 Another characteristic of arbitration is that the arbitrators are not state actors
but act as private members of the community. See Moses, The Principles and Practicesof
InternationalCommercial Arbitration at 2 (cited in note 211).
213 It has been argued that the FAA is a "super-statute" where the normal rules of
statutory interpretation do not apply. See William N. Eskridge Jr. and John Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215, 1260 (2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court has construed the
FAA broadly, with a breadth sweeping well beyond the statute's plain meaning and the
probable expectation of its framers in 1925.").
214 556 US 247 (2009). See generally Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism:
DisregardingStare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev 825
(2010).
211 Pyett, 556 US at 274. Since the Steelworkers Trilogy cases that were decided in
1960, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining agreements
have been enforceable because it is assumed that the union and the employer each
possess sufficient bargaining power so that the agreement to arbitrate is actually
consensual. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The Steelworkers Trilogy and the Evolution of
Labor Arbitration, Labor Law Stories (Foundation 2005) (Laura Cooper and Catherine
Fisk, eds). Given its exclusive bargaining representation status, unions can waive some,
but not all, NLRA rights of the workers it represents but certainly not Title VII claims
since the union could be a defendant in those claims.
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agreement for all workers in the unit, the claims of
discrimination that violate workers' rights are personal to
them.216

The consensual basis for arbitration no longer seems to
matter to a Court intent on finding ways to dump discrimination
cases out of court. Now that the Court has stripped arbitration
from its source in contract law, it is not clear what the basis is
for its new, non-contractual and non-public forum for resolving
statutory claims. It is certainly not grounded in the
antidiscrimination statutes, the Federal Arbitration Act, or the
National Labor Relations Act. 2 17 Because of its desire to strip
employees of their choice to litigate a Title VII or ADEA claim in
court, the Court has abrogated one of the defining
characteristics of arbitration, the idea that it is based on the
consent of both parties. The Constitution does not empower the
Supreme Court to create forums to resolve disputes since that
power is granted to Congress. 218 Because arbitrators are private
actors, the delegation of power to them by the Supreme Court
appears to raise issues of non-delegation of governmental power
that have not been at issue since before the New Deal. 2 1 9
The Court has upheld the application of arbitration
provisions that eviscerate the enforceability of statutory claims.
AT&TMobility v Concepcidn2 20 held that arbitration agreements
that expressly cut off all class or collective claims in arbitration
or litigation are enforceable even though they also cut off the
ability to bring those claims in court. 22 1 Even more recently, the
216 Unions can waive some economic and labor-related
rights of the workers they
represent. See, for example, Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36, 51-52 (1974)
(stating that "a union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity,
such as the right to strike); Metro Edison Co v NLRB, 460 US 693, 705-06 (1983) ("[A]
union may bargain away its members economic rights.").
217 Without a real basis in Congressional action and the powers
granted to Congress

in the Constitution and without any power given by Article III of the Constitution to the
Supreme Court to legislate, the arbitration agreement in Pyett is simply not enforceable
without the consent of the employees who are parties to a dispute with the employer but
who are not parties to any agreement to arbitrate the dispute.
218 US Const Art III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
219 It is ironic that this issue of unauthorized delegation of government power to
private actors is the one part of Schecter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495
(1935), that survives. There the delegation was to participants in the poultry industry,
while in Pyett, the delegation of power enforced by the courts is to private arbitrators.
220
131 S Ct 1740 (2011).
221
See id at 1753.
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Court in American Express Co u Italian Colors Restaurant222
held that a waiver of a class or collective claim in an arbitration
agreement is enforceable even when the claimants have shown
that the cost of individually arbitrating the statutory claim
exceeds the potential recovery. 223 That means that the statutes
at issue in Italian Colors Restaurant-theSherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts-are left unenforced and unenforceable by the
victims of unlawful conduct. Claims that would be upheld in a
context where enforcement was cost free are nevertheless not
brought since the cost of enforcement exceeds the potential
recovery. Allowing arbitration agreements to cut off class claims
in arbitration is questionable enough, but also allowing that
agreement to cut off the ability of those claimants to bring class
actions in court by forcing the whole dispute into arbitration is
simply unsupportable judicial activism.
Further, the Court has modified all arbitration agreements
by imposing on them a strong presumption that class or
collective claims are not arbitrable. 224 Thus, in Stolts-Nielsen
S.A. u AnimalFeeds International Corp,225 the Court held that,
in absence of express language providing for collective claims to
be decided in arbitration, arbitration agreements are necessarily
bilateral, so only disputes between the parties to the agreement
are arbitrable. 226 Since class members are not parties to the
arbitration agreement, there is no right to arbitrate collective
claims on their behalf.
Pyett and Stolts-Nielsen contradict one another. In StoltsNielsen, the Court presumes arbitration is limited to the actual

133 S Ct 2304 (2013).
See id at 2312.
224 Having gone down the path of creating a powerful presumption
in favor of the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, the Court has now rebutted that presumption
with a strong presumption against the arbitration of collective or class claims. Both
presumptions operate to interfere with the actual intent of the parties, an issue that
generally is at the heart of the enforceability of all contracts. Stolts-Nielsen appears at
odds with the text of the Federal Arbitration Act that provides that arbitration
agreements are to be enforced upon the same "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract," 9 USC § 2, since such a presumption appears to apply only to
arbitration agreements and not to contracts generally.
221
130 S Ct 1758 (2011).
226 Id at 682-83. See Charles A Sullivan and Timothy
P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the
222
223

Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 Ala L Rev 1013, 1038
(2013) ("Taken together, these decision indicate that an (unqualified) mandatory
arbitration clause in an otherwise enforceable contract will preclude joint, collective, or
class enforcement in both arbitral and judicial forums.").
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parties to the agreement, but Pyett forces claimants who are not
parties to the arbitration agreement to take their claims to
arbitration. The rationale for Stolts-Nielsen-that collective
claims are not arbitrable because class members are not parties
to the arbitration agreement-is confounded by Pyett, which
forces into arbitration claimants who are not parties to any
agreement to arbitrate.
What is consistent is that all these decisions diminish the
statutory rights of claimants, thereby furthering the larger
policy objectives of the Roberts Court to shrink the enforcement
possibilities of statutes like Title VII and the other
antidiscrimination statutes. 227
Pouring Title VII cases out of court and into arbitration
does not necessarily mean that these cases will be wrongly
decided or that Title VII will never be enforced. But since the
arbitration is forced on employees, it seems likely that the
number of Title VII claims that actually get decided is likely to
be lower if employees are required to go to arbitration than if
they could take advantage of their statutory right to enforce
those claims in state or federal court or to agree to arbitrate
once the dispute has arisen. Even as to those claims that go to
arbitration and even if they are decided fairly, there is a
significant global loss in enforcement of Title VII because the
proceedings are confidential. No one but the parties and the
arbitrator know the results, and no one else knows whether or
not those decisions are consistent with the law.
227 Even where employees have signed boilerplate arbitration
agreements, their
consent typically is extremely shallow. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate:

The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton 2012) (demonstrating
how the use of boilerplate has degraded traditional notions of consent, agreement, and
contract, and sacrificed core rights whose loss threatens the democratic order).
Employers can now force their workers to sign agreements as a condition of getting or
keeping their jobs, and thereby compel them to consent to arbitration, with consent
thereby shriveled to a tiny formalism. About one-fifth of all employees are subject to
employer imposed forced arbitration-a greater proportion of the workforce than is
protected by union contracts. These arbitration clauses are typically written solely by
employers' lawyers, and employees have no choice but to accept them or lose their jobs.
See Forced Arbitration(Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy), online at
http://www.employeerightsadvocacy.org/article.php/binding (visited Oct 18, 2014). Such
"agreements" are enforceable even if the employee is at-will and the arbitration
agreement stands as the sole written term of the contract. See, for example, In re
Halliburton Co, 80 SW3d 566, 573 (Tex 2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement
between an employer and an at-will employee is enforceable). To save the enforcement of
antidiscrimination statutes and to sustain the integrity of arbitration as a consensually
based system of dispute resolution, agreements for pre-dispute arbitration of statutory
claims should not be enforced.
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The Federal Arbitration Act, 22 8 which the Supreme Court
has rewritten to preempt state arbitration law, 2 2 9 makes
arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 230 Since contract law generally provides that
contracts can be declared unenforceable if they are
unconscionable, arbitration agreements can be held to be
unconscionable, but that is a difficult test to meet. 231 Unlike
determinations by judges or juries, the awards rendered by
arbitrators cannot be overturned for mistakes of either law or
fact since the grounds to vacate an award are limited to process
issues. 2 32 Further, arbitrators do not need to know the law and
many do not. 2 33 The EEOC does not know the level of
enforcement that arbitration provides for statutory rights or
9 USC §§ 1-16.
See Southland Corp v Keating, 465 US 1, 16 (1984).
230
9USC § 2.
231
Some arbitration agreements have been held to be unenforceable because they
are unconscionable under traditional contract law. For example, in Chavarriav Ralphs
Grocery Co, 733 F3d 916, 924-26 (9th Cir 2013), the Ninth Circuit held that an
arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it effectively gave Ralphs the ability
to select the arbitrator in almost all cases and required employees to pay at least half the
arbitration fees.
232
See 9 USC § 10:
228
229

(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where
arbitrators,

there

was
or

evident

partiality
either

or

corruption
of

in

the
them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which
the
rights of any party
have
been
prejudiced;
or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.

See generally Harry Edwards, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationCases:
An Empirical Study, 28 Proc Nat Acad Arb 59 (1976) (stating that arbitrators reported
that they did not follow antidiscrimination law but nevertheless felt competent to decide
discrimination cases).
233
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even what law is being applied in these private proceedings.
Congress is also denied its ability to monitor compliance and the
development
of
antidiscrimination
law. 2 34
Further,
confidentiality deprives the potential educational benefits to
workers being able to better know and therefore better able to
protect their rights and to employers to know their obligations
under the law. 2 35 All of this leaves Title VII law static because
there is no place for its development in light of new
circumstances. This helps to kill off its enforcement. 236
Arbitration can be a useful and an efficient way to resolve
disputes if, in fact, the agreement is consensual and is
structured by the parties to provide a fair and just way to
resolve the dispute. 2 37 In the employment context, as in many
other kinds of situations, agreements to arbitrate disputes once
they have arisen give the parties the option of customizing the
way their dispute will be resolved. In commercial and collective
bargaining agreement arbitration, pre-dispute arbitration can
also be valuable because both parties are likely to have real
bargaining power, and arbitrators have an incentive to be
neutral since both parties are likely to be repeat players in the
arbitration of subsequent disputes. With employers much more
likely than employees to be repeat players in employment

234 The history of the relationship between Congress and
the Supreme Court over
the meaning of the antidiscrimination statutes has largely been one of the Court making
restrictive interpretations that are then overturned by Congress. Subsequently, the
Court often appears to continue to thwart Congress. See Kate Webber, Correcting the
Supreme Court - Will it Listen? Using the Models of JudicialDecision-Making To Predict
the Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 23 S Cal Interdisc L J 305, 316-17 (2014).
235 See Fred Alvarez, et al, Class Actions and Patternand PracticeClaims: Overview
of Theories, Settlements and the Government's Activist Role, 591 PLI/Lit 275 (asserting
that the public is educated about employment discrimination laws by "headlines over the
last several years [that] have been filled with stories of record settlements reached in
various race and gender discrimination class actions lawsuits").
236 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, HR 1844, 113 Cong, 1st Sess
(May 7, 2013),
which would overturn the Supreme Court's rewriting of the FAA, has been introduced
and sent to committee but has not been acted upon. SeeGovtrack.us, Arbitration
FairnessAct of 2013, online at https: //www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 13/hrl844 (visited
Oct 18, 2014). The bill would revive the FAA as it was originally enacted to overcome the
common law resistance to arbitration in straightforward commercial contracts and would
overturn the Supreme Court decisions applying the FAA to employment and consumer
claims and preempting state law protecting consumers and workers.
237 In both Concepi6n, 131 S Ct at 1751-52, and in Stolts-Nielsen,
131 S Ct at 117,
the Court gave such substantial priority to arbitration that it trumped class action
claims because class actions sacrifice "the principal benefits of private dispute resolution,
including procedural informality, cost, and other efficiencies." Sullivan and Glynn, 64
Ala L Rev at 1027 (cited in note 226).
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arbitration, there is reason to believe that arbitrators will lean
in favor of employers. Pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes, especially if arbitration is the sole term of
the contract, 238 are almost always contracts of adhesion. It is
generally a take-it-or-leave-it situation because of the unequal
bargaining power between the parties. It is counterfactual to
describe these agreements as consensual in any meaningful
sense. Thus, the arbitration law the Supreme Court has created
undermines the notion that arbitration can be justified because
the parties have voluntarily agreed to it.239
An employee whose statutory claim is diverted to
arbitration loses her statutory right to her day in court as well
as the right to a jury trial provided by antidiscrimination
statutes and the Constitution. While class actions can be
brought to enforce employment discrimination statutes, 240 such
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,241 arbitration
provisions redirecting all statutory claims of employees to
arbitration are enforced even if the agreement cuts off all
statutory class or collective actions. 242 The Court claims that the
arbitration law it has created out of whole cloth is not
inconsistent with the provisions of these antidiscrimination
statutes that provide access to the courts because the rights to
go to court, to get a jury trial, and to bring class actions are, as
determined by the Court, "only" procedural and not
substantive. 243 Why that should make a difference is not so
clear. In any event, although the right to a jury trial may be
procedural, it is certainly a long cherished right that has been
238 There is some authority that the agreement to
arbitrate must be supported by
consideration. Compare Bailey v Federal National Mortgage Association, 209 F3d 740,
746 (DC Cir 2000) (holding that the employee did not agree to arbitrate simply by
continuing to work), with Michalski v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 177 F3d 634, 637 (7th Cir
1999) (holding that arbitration is binding because the employer promised to abide by the
arbitration award).
239
See Moses, The Principles and Practicesof InternationalCommercial Arbitration
at 537 (cited in note 2120). Concepci6n and Stolts-Nielson make it clear that the reason
driving arbitration jurisprudence is not some strong valuation of consent.
240 See, for example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
241
42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
242
Concepci6n, 131 S Ct at 1753. Since workers are consumers, this decision cuts off
their claims that would only be economically viable if aggregated with the claims of other
consumers with the same claims.
243 Title VII did not, as originally enacted, include
a right to a jury trial. When
Congress added that right in its 1991 amendments, it presumably thought that the right
was significant to the full enforcement of Title VII.
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shown to be more accurate than other forms of dispute
resolution. 244 Furthermore, denying the right to bring a class
action means that some good claims will never be brought
because their small economic value undermine the economic
ability of bringing them. Workers with small claims, who had no
real option other than to sign arbitration agreements, will be
completely denied any chance to have their substantive rights
vindicated because they have no choice but to take their claims
to arbitration, since the agreements will be enforceable and will
moreover effectively cut off the possibility of collective claims. 2 4 5
Without the possibility of bringing a class or collective
proceeding in either court or arbitration, many otherwise
meritorious claims will not be brought anywhere.
2.

Barriers to litigation.

Those employees with federal statutory claims, who
somehow escape arbitration and who can file actions in federal
court, are now faced with new and difficult procedural barriers
that the Supreme Court has erected that substantially reduce
their chances to bring class actions or to take any discrimination
case to trial.
Class actions can be an effective way to challenge
employment discrimination since many otherwise good claims
are of such low economic value that litigating them individually
is prohibitively expensive. These collective actions aggregate a
group of individual claims so that the underlying claims are
resolved and not just left unenforced for reasons unconnected
with their merits. 2 4 6 The Supreme Court, however, has made
bringing federal court class actions claiming discrimination
much more difficult because of its decision in Wal-Mart. 247 In
See generally Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's
Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence,68 Geo Wash L Rev 183 (2000).
241 While employers now have a strong incentive to force
their workers to arbitrate
all employment related disputes including their statutory claims, there now exists
authority to give them pause to force agreements to forego all class claims since those
violate the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 USC §§ 101-114, and National Labor Relations
Act, 29 USC §§ 151-169. See Sullivan and Glynn, 64 Ala L Rev at 1066 (cited in note
226) (asserting that arbitration agreements foregoing class or other collective actions are
illegal versions of"yellow-dog contracts").
246 It
is especially true that workers at the bottom of the compensation scale are
disproportionally impacted by cutting of class actions. It is also true that women and
people of color are likely to be near the bottom of the wage scale.
247
131 S Ct 2541 (2011) (holding that a nationwide class action by women employees
244
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Wal-Mart, the Court narrowed the availability of class actions
by its interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 248 Rule 23(a)(2) requires a party seeking class
certification to prove that there are "questions of law or fact
common to the class." 2 4 9 As was discussed earlier, the issue
underlying the claims of all members of the class was whether
Wal-Mart's policy of granting each store manager unstructured
and unreviewed discretion to make pay and promotion decisions
created a substantial risk of discrimination for all the women
working in all the stores, a risk that appeared to have been
realized because women workers were so much worse off than
their similarly situated male counterparts. 2 50 While never
directly addressing that underlying substantive issue, the Court,
nevertheless, held that there was no common question of "law or
fact" and so the class could not be certified. 251
While the Court claimed to rely on precedent, specifically

General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon,252 the Wal-Mart
decision extended Falcon well beyond the issues in that case. In
Falcon, the Court had rejected "across the board" class actions
where a plaintiff with, for example, a claim of discrimination in
promotions could bring a class action against the employer's
hiring discrimination and every other employment practice that
might discriminate. In contrast, in Wal-Mart, plaintiffs
challenged pay and promotion decisions that were not "across
the board." The pay and promotion decisions were closely related
since promotions strongly influenced pay and the same store
manager made both decisions. 253 Denying that these pay and
promotion decisions made pursuant to a single employer-wide
at Wal-Mart stores is not certifiable as a class action).
248 FRCP
23.
249 FRCP 23(a)(2).
250
Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2547. Where a policy of discrimination is alleged, the
plaintiff need not show that she was actually adversely affected. See Northeastern
Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v Jacksonville, 508 US
656, 666 (1993) (holding that contractors who could not show that they would have won
contracts if the defendant had relied on an affirmative action plan nevertheless can
bring a constitutional equal protection challenge the plan because of their risk of being
discriminated against).
211 Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2554-58.
212 Id at 2550; Falcon, 457 US at 156-160 (holding that
a class action for hiring
discrimination cannot extend to promotion discrimination).
213
Wal-Mart is an example of an instance where the ability to pursue a class action
would be particularly important because plaintiffs were all low-wage workers whose
individual claims were too expensive to litigate individually.
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policy raised common questions of law or fact is much more
restrictive than interpretations in earlier law. 2 54 Since the
opinion by Justice Scalia fails to discuss the real issues in the
case, the extent of Wal-Mart's impact is as yet unclear. 255
The Court has also imposed new and heightened pleading
standards for Title VII and other civil rights cases. Under the
longstanding "notice pleading" rules of Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-a complaint need only contain
a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief"256-Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
based on the complaint alone were difficult to achieve in Title
VII cases because notice pleading would typically provide the
defendant with sufficient information of what the claim was
about. Generally, if cases were disposed of without settlement
before trial, it would be after an answer was filed and discovery
was complete. If the case were dismissed short of trial, it
normally would be by Rule 56 summary judgment motion after
at least some discovery had occurred. In Ashcroft u Iqbal,2 57
however, the Court moved the real possibility of dismissal to the
earlier pleading stage before discovery. The Court now requires
a plaintiff to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." 2 58 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content, which is to be assumed to be true, allowing the
court plausibly to draw the inference that the defendant is liable
See generally Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons
for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 New Eng L Rev 229 (2012); Catherine Fisk and
Erwin Chemerinsky, The FailingFaith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T
Mobility v. Concepci6n, 7 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 73 (2011); Scott A Moss and
214

Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage Rights By
Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 Am U L Rev 523 (2012); Daniel D. DeVougas, Note,

Without a Leg to Stand On? Class Representatives, Federal Courts, and Standing
Desiderata,97 Cornell L Rev 627 (2012).
211 In light of Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit subsequently denied certification
of a
class in a case similar to Wal-Mart. See Ellis u Costco Wholesale Corp, 657 F3d 970, 975
(9th Cir 2011). But, the Seventh Circuit has upheld a large class action claiming race

discrimination. See McReynolds u Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 672 F3d
482, 492 (7th Cir 2012), which subsequently settled for $160 million. See Merrill Lynch
settles US race discriminationsuit for $160m, (BBC Aug 28, 2013), online at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23870879 (visited Oct 18, 2014).
216 FRCP 8(a)(2). See Swierkiewicz u Sorenma NA, 534 US 506, 515 (2002)
(holding
that a simple notice pleading of a claim of discrimination is sufficient).
27 556 US 662 (2009). See also Bell Atlantic Corp u Twombly, 550 US 544, 556

(2007).
218

556.

See Iqbal, 556 US at 678 (emphasis added), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 US at
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for the misconduct alleged. 259 Deciding plausibility, the Court
said, involves "a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." 260

A key question of fact in most statutory claims of
discrimination is whether the employer acted with an intent to
discriminate. 2 61 Whatever "intent to discriminate" means
legally, the actual reason for why the employer acted is
generally only known by the employer and need not be shared
with the adversely affected at-will employee before discovery.
While the employer may have given the worker a reason it
claims was the basis for its decision, discovery is useful and
typically necessary to probe for explanations other than that
"official" reason. Thus, dismissing a discrimination case before
discovery can foreclose the right of employees who have been
discriminated against to have any real chance to prove it. Iqbal
is not merely a theoretical threat to the antidiscrimination
project. Some preliminary evidence shows that plaintiffs' cases
have been increasingly dismissed at the pleading stage. 262
See Iqbal, 556 US at 678.
Id at 679. Given the skepticism of the federal judiciary about the continuing
existence of discrimination, what is plausible to many, may not be necessarily plausible
to many federal judges. If nothing else, by moving the risk of dismissal earlier in the
case, the Court has reduced the settlement value of the claims from what that value
would be at the summary judgment stage, thereby making it more difficult for workers
to bring their cases in the first instance and to have their rights vindicated. See
Yasutora Watanabe, Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and
Evidence from MedicalMalpracticeLitigation 3 (Nw U 2009):
219
260

As new information is revealed during bargaining, learning takes place and the
negotiating parties update their expectations of obtaining a favorable verdict. I
allow the rate of arrival of information to differ in the pre-litigation and the
litigation phases, for example because of the "discovery process" which follows
the filing of a lawsuit. Learning has the effect of drawing the plaintiff and
defendant's expectations of the trial results closer to each other, which in turn
increases the probability of agreement.
(On file with journal).
261
See Part II.A.
262
See Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U Richmond L Rev 603, 632-51 (2012) (proving significant
impact and contesting study of Federal Judicial Center that minimized Iqbal's impact).
See also Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 Yale L J 2270 (2012). No doubt a good
number of the dismissed cases were not likely to advance to trial after discovery because
they would be disposed of at the summary judgment stage. But, presumably, some of
these would prove to be good plaintiffs' cases if they had been allowed to advance to
discovery and trial.
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Iqbal heightens the already substantial barriers that
litigation imposes on Title VII plaintiffs. 2 63 Claims that
ultimately could be the basis for a finding of discrimination may
not make it past the pleading stage because of the barrier Iqbal
has created. Many claims that may well be good ones on the
merits but have only the potential of a small recovery will never
be brought because the expense of litigation makes them
prohibitive to litigate individually. 2 64 While plaintiffs can reduce
their costs of litigating by bringing their individual claims pro
se, the success rate of pro se cases is very poor, especially given
the complexity of the law and the lack of sophistication of all but
the rarest claimants. 265
See, for example, Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman, and Laura Beth
Nielsen,
Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 46 L & Soc Rev 1 (2012). This article illuminates the way in
which neutral legal rules and cultural frameworks based on the assumption that the
parties are equally-endowed obscures the structural disadvantages plaintiffs face.
Moreover, whatever burdens employers have in litigation are considered simply a cost of
doing business while employees shoulder these burdens in ways that are expensive but
also emotionally crushing. The study is based on 100 in-depth interviews with
defendant's representatives, plaintiffs, and lawyers based on 1,788 cases filed between
1988-2003. See id.
264 This is true even though a prevailing party can recover attorney fees in
discrimination cases. See, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(k).
261
Of course, many pro se cases may be without merit. There no doubt are, however,
cases that would be successful if the plaintiff was represented by counsel but that have
virtually no chance of success when attempted to be litigated by someone without legal
expertise. See, for example, Alan Feuer, Lawyering by Laymen: More Litigants Are
Taking a Do-It-Yourself Tack (NY Times Jan 22, 2001), online at http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/01/22/nyregion/lawyering-by-laymen-more-litigants-are-taking-a-do-it-yourselftack.htmlpagewanted all&src pm (visited Oct 18, 2014):
263

Most courts in the city and across the country do not keep statistics on pro se
litigation, though court watchers say there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that
they are on an upswing. The increase has been attributed to the abundance of
court programs on television and to the popularity of the do-it-yourself
movement as a whole. But the most prevalent reason still is not being able to
afford hundreds to thousands of dollars in lawyers' fees.
See also Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and
Fairnessin Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New
York, 30 Fordham Urban L J 305, 305-06, (2002):
Lost in the world of legal procedure and substantive case law, the pro se
litigant often finds herself confused and overwhelmed, if not frustrated and
bitter. Throughout their litigation, pro se litigants are confronted with
numerous
difficulties
including complying
with procedural
rules,
understanding substantive legal concepts, articulating relevant factual
allegations, and simply knowing how to proceed with their action. Despite the
liberal reading granted to pro se litigant pleadings, pro se litigants are almost
unanimously ill equipped to encounter the complexities of the judicial system.
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In sum, the contraction of the substantive protections
provided by antidiscrimination statutes and the erection of
significant procedural barriers diminishing access to fair dispute
resolution systems is a fundamental failure to provide legal
services to low- and middle-income claimants. 266 These workers
who are most in need of protection and most likely to be victims
of discrimination are being denied a chance to have their cases
decided on the merits in federal court or by arbitration if that is
their choice. 2 67 These maneuvers by the Supreme Court
substantially diminish but do not absolutely prevent
discrimination cases from being fairly decided. Their net result
is to narrow dramatically the ability of the victims of
employment discrimination to have their day in court or in
arbitration. 268
III.

PLAUSIBLY PLEADING DISCRIMINATION

This section will look at what the Roberts Court has left of
the enforcement of Title VII and the other antidiscrimination
statutes. The first part will look at the potential of reviving
antidiscrimination doctrine by applying the Ricci "color-blind"
approach to all claims brought claiming intentional
discrimination. The second part will explore the use of social
science research and general statistical evidence to establish
more
accurate
background
assumptions
that
make
discrimination claims plausible. What judges need to
266
Congress structured Title VII so that it was to be primarily enforced by workers
bringing their own claims. The Court has frustrated that purpose of Congress by its
procedural decisions.
267
One consequence of diminishing federal protections for workers is that workers

are left to their remedies under state laws and state court.
268
Forcing discrimination claims into arbitration does deny the worker her day in
court, her right to a jury trial, and her right to bring a class action where appropriate.
Even "mandatory" arbitration is a venue where workers' claims of discrimination will be
decided. It is, as of yet, not clear whether "mandatory" arbitration gives the worker as
good a chance or a worse chance of winning as does a court action. See Paul B. Marrow,
Determining if Mandatory Arbitration is 'Fair": Asymmetrically Held Information and
the Role of Mandatory Arbitration in Modulating Uninsurable ContractRisks, 54 NY L
Sch L Rev 187, 227 (2009-2010) (comparing 125 litigated cases with 186 securities
industry arbitration cases, showing that, "while the win rates in arbitration exceed those
realized in the courthouse, the amounts (on average) awarded by arbitrators were
significantly lower than the amounts awarded in court"). See also Michael Z. Green,
Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for
Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L J 399, 400-01 (2000) ("[T]he use of mandatory
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for employment discrimination claims has
failed to give employers an overall advantage").
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understand is that discrimination is not the very occasional
action by some rogue bad actor-the proverbial bad apple in the
barrel-but that it is very common and persists because it is
built into how most people respond to sensory stimuli most of
the time.
A.

Plausibly Pleading the Ricci "Color-Blind" Standard of
What Constitutes Evidence of Intent to Discriminate

Following Ricci, plaintiffs should plead that the intent
element of claims of disparate treatment is satisfied if the
defendant knew the race or gender consequences when the
action that is challenged took place. 2 69 That is all that the
plaintiffs pled and the Court approved in Ricci and that simple
approach should apply in all intentional discrimination cases.
White plaintiffs bringing "reverse" discrimination claims have
the easiest path toward judicial acceptance of this new test of
what constitutes evidence of intent to discriminate by relying
simply on Ricci. Women and people of color would have to get
the courts to take a step the Supreme Court has yet to take,
which is to apply the Ricci way of proving discrimination claims
to their claims.
As indicated earlier, a question that needs to be answered
before the Ricci color- and gender-blind standard can be used
generally is why the Court held that the City discriminated
against the white plaintiffs but did not find that it had
discriminated against their co-plaintiff who was exactly
similarly situated but who was Latino. The Court gave no
explanation for differentiating between the white and Latino
plaintiffs who all would be promoted immediately if the test
scores were used. There is nothing in the case suggesting that
the Latino plaintiff did not work as hard preparing for the test
as the white plaintiffs. The Latino plaintiff relied to his
detriment on the expectation that the test scores would be used
just like everyone else. In implementing the Court's decision, the
district court avoided discriminating against the Latino and
269 Plaintiffs in court can make this argument but so can claimants
in arbitration in
those instances where the claim is brought in arbitration. Given the confidential nature
of arbitration, outsiders to the arbitration would not know whether or not the arbitrator
accepted and applied this new approach to proving intent to discriminate. Arbitrators'
awards would also be sheltered from judicial review because questions of fact or law
cannot be the basis for judicial review.
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African Americans by promoting them along with the whites
with scores high enough to be promoted to open positions as
lieutenants and captains. The inexplicable differentiation the
Court made between the white and Latino plaintiffs should not
be a basis for refusing to develop the full potential of the Ricci
color-blind standard.
The practical argument against the Ricci color- and genderblind standard is that an employer would be liable whenever it
knew the race or gender of a worker at the time it took an
adverse action. While blinding themselves to the race or gender
of workers when making adverse decisions would require
employers to undertake substantial and careful changes to how
they made employment decisions, it does not seem impossible for
them to do so. Should the Court fear that such change would be
too difficult, it could always reconsider Ricci. The Court
extended its "color-blind" approach from affirmative action cases
to "reverse" discrimination cases in Ricci in a manner that
makes that approach very attractive to all plaintiffs claiming
intentional disparate treatment discrimination. Given that the
fundamental approach that it took in Ricci was so out of line
with normal judicial procedure, the Court could limit it as a oneoff decision that has no precedential value even in future
"reverse" discrimination cases. That might cause the Court to
rethink its use of "color-blind" rhetoric in affirmative action
cases. If Congress would amend Title VII to return to the preexisting and more difficult to prove standards of what
constitutes intentional discrimination, the Court might be
presented with an interesting challenge as to how to apply its
equal protection jurisprudence to a statute finding that a failure
to be color-blind was not discrimination.
B.

The Plausibility of Discrimination Informed by Evidence of
Stereotyping

As was explained earlier, background assumptions of a
judge or factfinder about the prevalence of discrimination are
inextricably connected to decisions about whether or not
discrimination has occurred in a particular case. 2 7 0 A

270
See Weiss, 4 Utah L Rev at 1678 (cited in note 12) ("[W]henever the factual
occurrence of differential treatment is at issue, triers of fact must make background
assumptions about the societal pattern of discrimination.").
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background fact that courts have long recognized is the
existence of stereotypical thinking, and that has been taken into
account in developing antidiscrimination law. This section will
first describe how evidence of stereotypical thinking has
informed the interpretation of antidiscrimination law. Second, it
will show how the acknowledgement by the Court of the
prevalence of stereotyping has informed antidiscrimination law
as it has developed. Finally, this section describes how social
science research, including research demonstrating the
extensive existence of implicit bias, demonstrates stereotyping.
1.

Acting on stereotypes is intentional discrimination.

An early and classic Title VII case, Slack v Havens,271
involved evidence that an adverse employment decision was
based on stereotypical thinking. In Slack, a supervisor ordered
some African American workers to undertake a difficult cleanup
of the workplace and, in response to the complaint that not just
the African Americans should do the cleanup, justified that
decision with expressions that revealed his stereotypical
reasoning: "Colored people should stay in their places," and
"Colored folks are hired to clean because they clean better." 2 7 2
These statements reflected stereotypes about African Americans
and, given that white workers were also available to do the
cleaning, amounted to admissions that the cleaning assignment
was made based on the race of the workers. 273 While it is clear
that these statements exhibited bias on the part of the
supervisor, what is not clear is whether the speaker was
conscious of his bias or whether his bias was unconscious.
The Supreme Court has relied on the phenomenon of
stereotypical thinking in developing antidiscrimination law. In

1982, in Mississippi University for Women v Hogan,274 the
university tried to argue that its exclusion of men from the
nursing school was justified because its policy "compensates for

271

7 FEP Cases (BNA) 885 (SD Cal 1973), affd as modified 522 F2d 1091 (9th Cir

1975).
See id at 889-90.
See Zimmer, 79 U Colo L Rev at 1279-80 (cited in note 75) (noting that the
supervisor "may not have been conscious that his statements reflected bias, but, by being
so forthcoming with a statement as to his actual state of mind that was biased, that
statement constituted strong support for a finding of discriminatory intent").
274 458 US 718, 727-28 (1982).
272
273
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discrimination against women." 2 7 5 The Court, however, viewed
the admission of only women to a nursing school as simply
reinforcing stereotypical views that the proper role for women is
to be nurses rather than doctors. "Rather than compensate for
discriminatory barriers faced by women, the policy of excluding
males from admission . . . tends to perpetuate the stereotyped

view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."2 76
In 1989, in Price Waterhouse,277 the Court held that adverse
employment actions based on sex stereotyping constituted sex
discrimination. 2 7 8 Ann Hopkins challenged the decision by her
employer to put her bid for partnership on hold. 2 7 9 Some of the
evidence supporting her claim was what the partner who told
her the bad news had said. He suggested she would have a
better chance to be made partner the following year if she would
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry." 280 Accepting the lower court's finding that "a number of
the partners' comments [made during the partnership decisionmaking process] showed sex stereotyping at work," Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, concluded that:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for
"[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against
271
276

See id at 727.
Id at 729.

490 US 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See generally Kimberly A Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping
Prohibition at Work, 161 U Pa L Rev 757 (2013). For an exposition about Price
Waterhouse, see Bernstein, 55 Ariz L Rev at 681-719 (cited in note 33) ('Stereotyping
curbed Ann Hopkins' movements, consumed her time, limited what she could say,
reduced her opportunities to get credit for what she achieved, and locked her out of the
Price Waterhouse partnership.").
279
See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 231-32.
280
See id at 235, quoting the district court, Hopkins u Price Waterhouse, 618 F Supp
1109, 1117 (1985). Some of the statements of partners that were solicited during the
process of making the partnership decisions also referred to her gender as a negative:
277

278

One partner described her as "macho"; another suggested that she
"overcompensated for being a woman"; a third advised her to take "a course at
charm school." Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one
partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only "because
it's a lady using foul language."
Id.
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individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." . . . An

employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible Catch 22: out of a job if
they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.281
One side of the Catch-22 was that the partners appeared to
expect her to exhibit traditional "feminine" characteristics and
decided against her partnership bid because she failed to
conform to their expectations of what women should look like,
what they should wear, and how they should act. The other side
of the catch was that only aggressive, driven people-those who
conform to the stereotypical expectation for men-are qualified
to be partners. While she exhibited those characteristics, she
was not a man and so she did not present as partnership
material. 282
In 1996, in United States v Virginia,283 the Court rejected
the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) argument that the bar to
women's admission should be upheld because women would be
unable and unwilling to undergo the school's "adversative
approach" 284 to education because that would be acting on
stereotypes about women: the VMI "may not exclude qualified
individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females' 2 85 or "rely on 'overbroad'
generalizations to make 'judgments about people that are likely
2 86
to . . . perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination."'
In all of these cases, the existence of evidence of or
arguments based on what the courts viewed to be stereotyping
determined the outcome that an antidiscrimination law had
been violated.

Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251.
Id at 250 ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
acted on the basis of gender.").
281
282

283

518 US 515 (1996).

284

Id at 535.
Id at 541.
Id at 542.

285
286
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Examples of stereotyping that inform
antidiscrimination law.

In 1978, in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v
Manhart, 287 the employer pension rule expressly required
greater monthly contributions from women than men so that
women would get equal monthly benefits when they retired. 288
That was systemic disparate treatment:
It is well recognized that employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere "stereotyped" impressions about the
characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely
habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to
perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable
reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or
for paying them less. 2 89
Thus, that began the authority for the proposition that employer
action based on racial or gender stereotypes violates Title VII.
In 1983, in EEOC v Wyoming, 290 the Court held that
Congress enacted the ADEA because older workers were being
discriminated against in employment on the basis of inaccurate
and stigmatizing stereotypes:
Although age discrimination rarely was based on the sort
of animus motivating some other forms of discrimination,
it was based in large part on stereotypes unsupported by
objective

fact.

. .

. Moreover,

the

available

empirical

evidence demonstrated that arbitrary age lines were in
fact generally unfounded and that, as an overall matter,
the performance of older workers was at least as good as
that of younger workers. 29 1

In 1984, in Palmore v Sidotti, 292 the lower courts had
justified granting custody of a child to her white father because

287
288
289

435 US 702 (1978).
Id at 705.
Id at 707.

290 460 US 226 (1983) (holding that the ADEA is within the constitutional power of
Congress to impose on the states).
291 Id at
231.
292

466 US 429 (1984).
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the child's mother had married an African American. 293 The
basis for removing the child from the mother's custody was the
court's determination that the child would face discrimination if
she lived in a mixed-race family. The Court rejected that
argument. While racial stereotypes exist and the child might be
stigmatized, "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect." 294 Therefore, the stereotypes that some
members of the general public had about mixed-race families did
not justify government discrimination by its reliance on those
stereotypes to decide child custody questions.
In 1993, in Hazen Paper Co v Biggins,295 the Court again
cited the existence of stereotypes as an important driving force
for the prohibition of age discrimination.
It is the very essence of age discrimination for an older
employee to be fired because the employer believes that
productivity and competence decline with old age. ...
Thus the ADEA commands that "employers are to
evaluate [older] employees on their merits and not their
age." The employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an
employee's
remaining
characteristics,
such
as
productivity, but must instead focus on those factors
directly. 296
Thus, as in Manhart, the employer in Hazen Paper could not
justify how it treated an individual who was an older worker by
relying on stereotypes about older workers. In sum, the Court
has relied on stereotypes to support drawing the inference of
discrimination, to explain why discrimination is prohibited, and
to reject arguments that justify express discrimination based on
stereotypes.
3.

Implicit bias explains stereotyping.

While some stereotyping is simply blatant, conscious
animus, social science research demonstrates that implicit bias
293
294

Id at 431-32.
Id at 433.

29'

507 US 604 (1993).

296

Id at 6 10-11.
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is widespread and frequently is what drives stereotyping. As
was shown in Part I, the existence of implicit bias is one
important way to understand the persistence of discrimination.
That demonstration should be useful in pleading cases to satisfy
the Iqbal plausibility standard in response to motions to dismiss
antidiscrimination complaints. At the pleading stage in
litigation, the trial court is asked to determine whether the
factual allegations in the complaint, which must be assumed to
be true, would lead a factfinder at trial to determine that such
facts would plausibly support a finding that the adverse action
the plaintiff challenges had "a motivating factor" of
discrimination
or, where the
"but-for" test applies,
discrimination was the but-for cause for an adverse action. In
making that determination, the trial judge is inevitably putting
the facts that are alleged into the larger context of the
prevalence of discrimination. Take an example. Suppose a white
male professor who is substantially over age sixty-five, who is
employed at-will, and whose teaching, scholarship, and service
have never been challenged. Nevertheless he is terminated with
no reason given. A trial judge deciding an Iqbal motion to
dismiss his claim would be called upon to decide plausibility
based on the judges "judicial experience and common sense." 2 97
As is clear from the "reverse" discrimination cases brought by
white males, the trial judge might be hard pressed to find race
or sex discrimination to be plausible absent some special
circumstances. 2 98 The claim of age discrimination, however,
should suggest to the judge a much greater possibility that age
discrimination is plausible because implicit bias concerning the
ability of older workers is common and the claimant is an older
worker.
As was established in Part I, there is considerable evidence,
looking at the question from a number of sources, that
discrimination persists. Further, Part I also develops the social
science support for the idea that implicit bias triggers much of
that discrimination. In deciding whether discrimination is
plausible, trial judges would not be asked to look to what
297
298

Iqbal, 556 US at 679.
See, for example, Good v University of Chicago Medical Center, 673 F3d 670, 678

(7th Cir 2012) (even assuming a white plaintiff was treated worse than three non-white
comparators, the court ruled that it could not "conclude that Good's disparate treatment
was racially motivated without evidence pointing more directly to a discriminatory
motive without reliance on speculation").

19]

TITLE VI'S LAST HURRAH

89

historically has been called "legislative facts"-facts used to
create or modify law-and would not be using social science
research as "adjudicative facts"-facts that occurred in the case
at hand. 299 To say this another way, the judge would not be
required to view evidence of implicit bias as applied to decide
the motion at hand but instead should find relevant this social
science research as establishing "pure" background assumptions
about the prevalence of discrimination. 300 The research showing
the persistence of discrimination and how implicit bias is a
cause of that persistence would be used to inform the "judicial
experience and common sense" of the judge in determining
whether the facts set forth in the complaint plausibly plead
discrimination.
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court rejected so-called "social
framework" social science evidence as proving as a fact that
Wal-Mart had a general policy of discrimination. "Dr. William
Bielby, their sociological expert... testified that Wal-Mart has a
'strong corporate culture,' that makes it 'vulnerable' to 'gender
bias.' He could not, however, 'determine with any specificity how
regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment
decisions at Wal-Mart."' 301 That does not mean that this
testimony would not be useful to a judge in determining the
background plausibility that a policy neutral on its face, such as
granting unreviewed discretion to store managers to make pay
and promotion decisions, could be discriminatory in its
operation. It would seem wrong-headed to exclude information
that would educate judges; they must be assumed to be
educable. 302
299
See Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 Harv L Rev 364, 404-07 (1942) (originating the use of these terms for
administrative law but they have proved useful in litigation as well); John Monahan and
Laurens Walker, A Judge's Guide to Using Social Science, 43 Court Review: The Journal
of the American Judges Association 156, 163 (2007) ("[T]here is a trend rapidly gaining
credibility in American courts to use social science . . . as a social framework providing a
general empirical context within which to determine specific facts at issue in a case.").
The use proposed here gives an empirical context to the persistence of discrimination
and the sources for that discrimination but does not propose using this evidence that
there was discrimination in the particular case at issue. Instead, its proposed use is to
help educate the judge and to enhance her judicial experience in making a plausibility
determination.
soo See Weiss, 4 Utah L Rev at 1679 (cited in note 12).
so' Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2553-54.
302
In the face of the considerable evidence supporting the existence and operation of
implicit bias, trial judges should be asked to take the IAT test as part of educating
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Even judges can appear to be victims of implicit bias if they
act on the basis of background assumptions that reflect
stereotypes. In Ricci, the Court expressed empathy for the white
test takers, despite the evidence that members of all three racial
groups would be either helped or hurt by using or not using the
test. That empathy supported the Court's judgment that the
discrimination was solely against those white test takers who
would not be promoted if the test results were not used. It is
possible that implicit bias was at work to explain a result that is
not consistent with the evidence in the record. Stereotypes can
be positive as well as negative. 303 The positive stereotype that
might be reflected in the Ricci decision was that whites were the
lieutenants and captains in the fire department. Lacking that
positive stereotype, the two Latino firefighters, who were
otherwise similarly situated to the white plaintiffs who would be
promoted if the tests scores were used, were simply treated as if
they were not victims of discrimination. In Wal-Mart, Justice
Scalia's background assumption that most store managers
would not discriminate is another example of a positive
stereotype since there was nothing in the record to support that
assumption. This background assumption contributed to the
Court's decision to deny class certification but it is contestable
because of the considerable evidence that discrimination persists
among managers. More recently, in Nassar,304 the Supreme
Court appears to have relied on a stereotype in deciding to make
proof of Title VII retaliation cases harder. Counsel for the
employer presented a hypothetical fact pattern of employees
gaming the retaliation provisions of Title VII to protect
themselves from adverse employment actions that had nothing
to do with discrimination. The image of the worker gaming the
employer through the calculated misuse of the law brings to
mind the powerful stereotype that Ronald Reagan evoked of
"welfare queens," driving around in "welfare Cadillacs." 305 That

themselves about the persistence of discrimination.
sos See Sidhu, 17 U Pa J Const L at *65 (cited in note 9). A positive stereotype would
be that women are emotionally sensitive but a negative one would be that men are not.
304
133 S Ct 2517 (2013).
so' See Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, NY Times Opinion (NY Times Nov 19,
2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html (visited
Oct 18, 2014) ("Reagan repeatedly told the bogus story of the Cadillac-driving welfare
queen-a gross exaggeration of a minor case of welfare fraud. He never mentioned the
woman's race, but he didn't have to.").
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stereotype, held by many, proved to be powerful politically when
it was evoked by candidate Reagan, yet it was not based on fact.
Nor is the existence of gaming workers reflected in the record in

Nassar.
At the pleading stage, it is important to attempt to establish
realistic background assumptions about the persistence of
discrimination and how implicit bias can trigger actions based
on stereotypes that help cause that persistence in general. With
more realistic background assumptions, trial judges can make
better decisions about the plausibility of what the plaintiff has
pled in the complaint when the judge decides whether to grant a
motion to dismiss based on Iqbal.
IV. CONCLUSION

It will take some time before it can be assessed whether the
enforcement of Title VII and the other antidiscrimination
statutes will be resuscitated. 306 If the attempt to use the Ricci
"color-blind" approach in disparate treatment claims generally
fails and if judges are not receptive to the use of the general
statistical evidence of continuing discrimination to inform their
decisions on whether a complaint is plausible, then the present
policy of the Supreme Court to radically constrict if not end the
antidiscrimination project will have achieved its goal of ending
the antidiscrimination project. Should that be so unfortunate as
to happen, then some alternative approaches need to be
considered. 307 It has been suggested that the EEOC be more
active in litigation because it is not barred from court by
arbitration agreements to which they are not party or by the

so6 Given that many statutory claims will be precluded from being brought in court
because the only forum for their resolution is arbitration, the level of Title VII
enforcement will be extremely hard to establish. Thus, the assessment can realistically
only be made by what happens in the courts.
so7 Rahm Emanuel is famous for saying, "You never let a serious crisis go to waste.
And what I mean by that it's an opportunity to do things you think you could not do
before." See Rahm Emanuel quote (BrainyQuote 2014), online at http://www.
brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/r/rahmemanue409l99.html#kW8aRLtbKuYh5gJ.99
(visited Oct 18, 2014). Congress has responded rather regularly to unfortunate Supreme
Court decisions but, even in a broad statute like the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
recent amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, these amendments have
been piecemeal and that leads to subsequent under-enforcement by the recalcitrant
federal courts. See generally Deborah Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of
Powers: Statutory Interpretationof Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 511
(2009).
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requirements of Rule 23 when bringing collective actions. 308
Another alternative would be to expand legal services for
discrimination claimants whose claims are valid but where the
economic value makes them too expensive to litigate privately.
This would do much to alleviate the extensive amount of pro se
plaintiffs in Title VII claims brought in federal court and would
probably reduce the number of these claims where counsel
determines there is little or no chance for success.
This might, in fact, be an opportune time more generally to
take a fresh look at how labor and employment law is
enforced. 309 Among the drastic things that could be done would
be to replace the at-will presumption with a presumption of
some sort of job security. Even more dramatic would be to create
a new forum to decide all discrimination claims or even all labor
and employment disputes, which would be as independent of the
judiciary as possible. Since the Court has approved of what it
calls "arbitration" even in absence of any consent on the part of
statutory claimants, it might be prudent to call this new public
forum to resolve employment disputes "arbitration." Some other
countries, such as Mexico, call their public systems of labor and
employment law "Conciliation & Arbitration Boards," something
along those lines would be appropriate. 310 Unlike our present
systems of private arbitration, this new forum could be
organized in a number of different ways as a public body
including the kind of tripartite representation that is used in
some other countries. 311 Assuming this new forum would be
sos

See Bornstein, 33 Yale L & Pol Rev at *40-45 (cited in note 4).
See generally William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from
Parliament's Playbook and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 Vand L Rev 135
(2013) (calling for Congress to reform American employment law by looking at new UK
legislation). When the American Law Institute decided to undertake a Restatement of
the common law of employment, I suggested that a better project would be to undertake
a review of the entire area of labor and employment law. The time may now be ripe to do
exactly that. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, The Restatement is the Wrong Project, 13
Employee Rts & Employ Pol J 205 (2009).
s0 See Roger Blanpain, et al, Global Workplace: International and Comparative
Employment Law: Cases and Materials 310-18 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed 2012). See also
Law of the People's Republic of China on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes
(Dec 29, 2007), online at www.cietac.org/index/references/Laws/47607b5418c9657f001.
cms (visited Oct 18, 2014). For an overview of that law, see Jim H. Young and Lin Zhu,
Overview of China's New Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law (Davis Wright
Tremain LLP 2012), online at http: //www.dwt.com/advisories/Overview of Chinas New
LaborDisputeMediation andArbitrationLaw_01_29_2008/ (visited Oct 18, 2014).
s.. See Blanpain, et al, Global Workplace at 310-18 (cited in note 310). The
government, employer, and worker representatives decide the cases in tripartite
309
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created by Congress, it should include provisions that allow
claimants in labor and employment disputes to opt to take their
disputes to it without regard to any claim that the disputes were
subject to private, contract-based arbitration but also to
continue to allow post-dispute private arbitration. Given that
the Supreme Court seems intent on not hearing statutory
discrimination disputes and since judicial review of the present
arbitration system is quite limited because there is no review for
mistakes of law or fact, perhaps the new forum could operate
with judicial review that was limited to due process issues. 312

jurisdictions such as Mexico and Germany.
312
Needless to say, stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over certain matters and
the creation of alternative dispute resolution forums is fraught with constitutional
questions. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 173-264 (Wolters
Kluwer 5th ed 2007).

